La Logique

July 9, 2021 – 10:05 pm

La logique a été découverte par Aristote, ou peut-être il l’a inventé. Selon la version traditionnelle, il avait remarqué que parmi certains arguments les raisons garantissent la conclusion. Il n’est pas possible que les raisons soient vraies et la conclusion fausse. Un argument de cette sorte nous appelons maintenant ‘valide’. Aristote a en outre noté que pour certains des arguments, c’était la forme elle-même de l’argument qui garantissait la validité. C’est évident par exemple qu’un argument avec la forme ‘si A alors B, et A, alors B’ est valide – en fait c’est valide ‘formellement’. le système de règles relatives à la validité formelle est ce que nous appelons la logique. Et maintenant, on peut utiliser la logique pour découvrir si un argument dans la langue courante est valide ou non : tout simplement, si l’argument original puisse être mis dans une forme valide, sans perdre le sens de l’original, l’argument doit être valide.

Bon, mais comment savons-nous qu’une forme est valide ? C’est peut-être un fait de l’univers, mais ce n’est pas une chose que nous avons découverte par l’observation comme nous avons découvert la forme du monde. Nous pouvons admettre la possibilité que le monde soit plat, mais nous ne pouvons pas même comprendre la proposition qu’une loi de la logique ne tienne pas. C’est peut-être donc une loi de la pensée – c’est-à-dire, psychologique. Mais non, parce que personne n’accepterait que les arguments valides pour un singe, un chien, ou un extraterrestre soient différents que les arguments valides pour nous. Encore, on ne peut pas même comprendre la possibilité. Donc nous nous retrouvons avec un mystère. Les plus surs de nos arguments reposent elles-mêmes sur des fondations sans support.

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L’antidote à l’athéisme

July 9, 2021 – 10:04 pm

Qu’est-ce qu’un athée ? Quelqu’un qui croit qu’il n’y a pas de Dieu. Pourquoi croit-il cela ? Dans la littérature il y a pas mal de raisons et d’arguments données, mais pour un philosophe il n’y a qu’un seul argument significatif : qu’il n’y a aucune raison suffisante à justifier la croyance en un dieu. L’athée accepte qu’il est impossible à prouver soit que Dieu existe ou non, donc la question de la croyance doit être résolue par d’autre moyens, par les considérations autres que la raison pure ou la preuve. Le plus souvent le philosophe raisonne en cette façon : si  les raisons à croire en Dieu sont de la même force que les raisons à croire en des fantômes ou des gobelins, et c’est ridicule les accepter, alors c’est ridicule à accepter Dieu, donc je dois le nier.

Le philosophe en ce cas fait un choix et suivant les règles générales qui détermine si que l’on puisse croire ou non en une idée la croyance en dieu est rejetée. Mais ‘Dieu’ n’est pas une idée comme les autres et il y a peut-être des considérations spéciales qu’il faut qu’on prenne en compte. Par exemple si il n’y a pas un Dieu le monde n’a pas une raison d’être. On n’accepterait point pour aucune chose autre qu’il existe tout simplement sans raison. Pourquoi accepterions-nous cela pour le monde entier. En plus, si le monde n’a pas une raison d’être, nous n’en avons non plus. Est-ce que le philosophe pense qu’une vie sans but ni raison vaut la peine de vivre ? Pense-t-il que l’idée d’une vie sans but l’aidera à vivre sa vie ?  Non ? Donc on peut douter que le choix d’accepter cette idée est la meilleure que l’on puisse faire.

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The Ruling Bullshits of Our Time

July 2, 2021 – 8:49 pm

I put this together in just a half hour or so after talking to a friend who remarked upon how much nonsense we were supposed to believe. Note that I didn’t even have to talk about the temporary bullshits of the current news cycle, and I haven’t mentioned any of the bullshits of the ‘pandemic’.

Western civilisation/society is White Supremacist

  • It suffers from Systemic Racism
    • Or maybe it’s Structural
    • White Privilege
    • Whiteness
  • Implicit Bias Tests measure something real
  • Blacks are over-represented in prison populations
  • Blacks are killed disproportionately by Police
  • Racism is power + prejudice
  • Any racial disparity in outcomes is evidence of racism
  • ‘Critical Race Theory’
    • All/Only whites are racist
  • X is racist (for all values of X)
  • Affirmative Action is the opposite of racial discrimination
  • The ‘Stolen Generations’
  • Race doesn’t exist
    • It’s a ‘social construction’

We live in a patriarchy

  • Possibly even a “cisheteropatriarchy”
  • Any sexual disparity in outcomes is evidence of sexism
  • There are no differences between men and women’s psychologies, preferences, capabilities
  • “Believe all women!”

Your sexual identity is whatever you say it is

  • There are more than two genders
  • Gender is a continuum
  • Gender is fluid
  • Gender is unrelated to sex
  • Trans-women are real women (ditto men)
  • My pronouns are …

Diversity is an absolute moral good

  • ‘Diversity is our strength’

Multiculturalism is the only justifiable option (ITW (=In the West))

  • All (other) cultures are equal
    • Who are we to judge them or criticize?
  • All migrants are net positives for the receiving society (ITW)
  • No common culture (ITW) is required or possible or should be defended
  • There is no upper limit on the number of immigrants that can be accommodated (ITW)
  • Immigration has no downsides – regardless of source, culture, numbers, legality, …
    • There is especially no problem with unregulated, unrestricted mass-immigration of Muslims from backward countries
      • There are no ‘No-Go Zones’
    • Ethnic criminal gangs are not a problem/barely exist
  • Migrant assimilation (ITW) is an unjust expectation
  • Morality is relative to culture

The environment is deteriorating

  • There are too many people
    • The planet cannot support us
  • Plastic bags! Plastic bags everywhere! They have to be stopped!
  • Sustainability is a coherent concept – and an absolute moral good
  • Recycling is always worth doing – and an absolute moral good
  • We face Catastrophic Anthropogenic Global Warning
    • The Barrier Reef is dying
    • Pacific Islands are sinking
    • Climate refugees
    • The North Pole will be ice-free by [current date + 10]
  • The world is doomed because of X (X= acid rain/organophosphates/ozone hole/CAGW/…)
  • In order to prevent environmental disaster X, the economic system has to be overthrown

We are too rich (= greedy/selfish)

  • Our material preferences are morally contemptible – so ‘middle class’
  • the planet cannot support our lifestyle
  • Our lifestyle causes environmental deterioration
  • We must face the ‘Limits to Growth’
    • Economic growth cannot continue because the planet is finite
    • The rest of the world can’t become as rich as us
  • It is evidence of structural injustice that the rest f the world isn’t as rich as us
    • Our wealth is gotten by exploitation of the third world
    • We deliberately keep them poor
    • The economy is a zero-sum game

Coal, oil, and gas power are too dangerous (they cause CAGW)

  • Fracking is dangerous
  • Our energy needs can be met with wind and solar power
  • Nuclear power is too dangerous
  • “No blood for Oil!”

We’re running out of resources

  • Peak oil

Organic farming can feed us

  • Organic produce is ‘natural’ and so better

GMOs are too dangerous

Chemicals are bad

  • Pesticides/herbicides/fertilizers/… are bad
  • Plastics are bad
    • Plastic bags are filling the oceans
  • Medical drugs are bad
    • ‘Traditional’ medicines work
    • ‘Big Pharma’ suppresses effective alternative treatments to profit from sickness

Modern Art

‘Continental Philosophy’

  • ‘Post-Modernism’
  • “There is nothing outside the text”
  • Reality is a set of discourses
    • Discourses are structured to advantage powerful groups
  • There is no such thing as objective truth
    • Truth is determined by power (Foucault etc.)
  • Knowledge is socially constructed

Islam is a religion of peace

  • Jihad is a ‘personal struggle’
  • They hate us because of the Crusades
  • Islamophobia
  • We wouldn’t have the Renaissance or Science without Islam

One man’s ‘Terrorist’ is another man’s ‘Freedom Fighter’

Imperialism/Colonialism is only a Western thing

  • It’s always bad
  • I/C explains why most non-western countries are shitholes
    • Most non-western countries are not shitholes

Nationalism is a bad thing and nation-states are bad

  • ‘Patriotism is the last resort of a scoundrel’
    • (National) flags are problematic
  • Any act to secure (our) borders is immoral
  • It’s a ‘refugee crisis’
    • ‘Push factors’
  • (Other) people have a right to live wherever they want
  • The UN has superior moral and legal authority
  • ‘International law’ is law
  • Palestine is a nation
    • Poor, poor Palestinians. They only want justice.
    • Israel is a colonial/settler/apartheid state

Hate speech isn’t free speech

IQ scores don’t measure anything – certainly not intelligence

  • ‘Intelligence’ isn’t a thing
  • There are no group differences in intelligence
    • There are especially no ‘racial’ differences in intelligence
    • Evolution stops at the neck

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Huayan: Interpenetration

May 12, 2021 – 9:44 am

The idea that phenomena and noumena are the same thing also featured in the doctrines of the Huáyán (??) school, in which it appears as a consequence of a more general claim concerning the interpenetration of all levels of reality. This school is another of those Chinese schools which made an original contribution to Buddhist philosophy. Its name is just the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit avata?saka , or ‘Flower Garland,’ which is the name of a sutra which it regards as especially important and from which it claimed to have derived it’s particular philosophical positions. The doctrine of interpenetration (??, yuán róng,) which we shall now investigate, is supported, for example, by such passages as the following.

They . . . perceive that the fields full of assemblies, the beings and aeons which are as many as all the dust particles, are all present in every particle of dust. They perceive that the many fields and assemblies and the beings and the aeons are all reflected in each particle of dust.

The interpretation of this is that nothing exists as itself independently of every other existing thing, but that everything participates in every other thing. But a mere statement of a position has little value, it requires some support or justification in order to count as more than speculation. In this case the observation is made that no dharmas (psycho-physical atoms) have self-existence, because their existence is dependent upon extraneous conditions. You might remember this as one of the standard claims of the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nagarjuna. The inference is drawn from this, however, that ultimately the existence of anything is dependent upon everything else. Presumably this is partly because it seems plausible that if A depends on B and B depends on C, and so on, then eventually, the world being finite[1], Z will depend on A; and therefore, dependence being transitive, every member of that sequence will depend on every other member of that sequence. Of course, there are quite a few assumptions in there: apart from the two mentioned we would also need to suppose that the world is not partitioned into mutually exclusive cycles of dependency. (We might also have to answer the objection that if A ultimately depends on A, then A has self-existence, but let that pass.)

The argument is also made that since the existence of anything – and thus its identity – is dependent upon the existence – and thus the identity – of some other thing, that ‘one is all’ and ‘all is one.’ Again, the exact steps by which the premisses support the conclusion are somewhat obscure, but if we focus on the ‘identity’ part of the claim, we might be dealing with a kind of semantic holism in which the meaning of the name of a thing – and thus presumably, the identity of a thing – is what it is in virtue of its (conditioning) relationships with all the other named things (and thus their identities.) In the philosophy of language this sort of holism amounts to the claim that ‘dog’ means what it does because that word exists in a particular network of relationships with other words in the language, like ‘cat’, ‘chase’, ‘bone’, ‘pat’, ‘horse’, ‘wolf’, etc. Quite how that holism would work in the ‘identity’ case would be left as an exercise for the reader, but there is a clue to how we might think about it in the use by one of the school’s leaders (the patriarch F?zàng, (?? 643–712)) of a simile involving a rafter and a building.[2] He argues that the building is the rafter because the building is the sum of all its parts and the rafter is one of its parts; and the rafter is the building because the rafter is only a rafter because of the relationship it has to the building. That’s not particularly convincing as an example of the claim that ‘all is one and one is all,’ but if we say that the building is in the rafter and the rafter is in the building, which seems closer to what the interpenetration claim would support, then the arguments from semantic holism would fit better.

A famous image that is used to illustrate this doctrine is that of Indra’s Net

The manner in which all dharmas interpenetrate is like an imperial net of celestial jewels extending in all directions infinitely, without limit. … As for the imperial net of heavenly jewels, it is known as Indra’s Net, a net which is made entirely of jewels. Because of the clarity of the jewels, they are all reflected in and enter into each other, ad infinitum. Within each jewel, simultaneously, is reflected the whole net [3]

The identity of noumena (referred to by li, ?, in the Huayan tradition) and phenomena (shi, ?) which was mentioned above follows from the interpenetration doctrine. It’s easier to see how this might be made plausible if we overstate the case to begin with: thus, if every dharma A contains dharma B and every B contains A, then every A is really the same as B. (This is like the result in set theory that if A is a subset of B and B is a subset of A, then A and B are the same set.) Now if every dharma is the same as every other dharma, and both noumena and phenomena are classes of dharma, then every phenomenal dharma is a noumenal one and vice versa. The Huayan position doesn’t in fact seem to be that every dharma is identical – thought I don’t quite see why it isn’t – but the fact that every noumenal dharma interpenetrates every phenomenal dharma indicates that the two classes are not in fact distinct classes of dharma and so noumena and phenomena are the same thing.

A famous image that is used to illustrate this doctrine is that of the Golden Lion. Fazang used this to explain the point to the empress Wu. He pointed at a golden statue of a lion and said that the statue appears to be a lion, and this is a fact we need to accept, but we also have to accept that there is no lion there, only particles of gold. The gold of the lion is like li, the noumenon, and the lion-appearance is like the shi, phenomenon. The lion-appearance is dependent upon the gold, and each particle of gold is the same as every other particle, so the identity of each particle – in so far as it is distinguishable – can only depend upon the lion-appearance to which it contributes.

[1] In fact, book 30 of the Avatamsaka Sutra appears to deny this.

[2] In Paragraphs on the Doctrine of Difference and Identity of the One Vehicle of Huayan (????????), T1866.

[3] Calming and Contemplation in the Five Teachings of Huayan (??????) T1867. Tr. by Fox, A (2015) ‘The Practice of Huayan Buddhism’, ?????????????, (pp. 259-286,) p. 265

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Two Truths Doctrine Deprecated

May 12, 2021 – 9:07 am

Nagarjuna’s (2nd-3rd C) doctrine of Two Truths is accepted by all Mahayanists. It refers to a method of instruction in which statements were open to alternative possible interpretations depending on the level of sophistication of the audience; a method that Buddha used in order to make his doctrines accessible. The two truths are distinguished as

  1. Conventional truth (sa~vrti-satya) which characterizes statements that are true by convention and by which we may describe our daily experience of a concrete world, and
  2. Ultimate truth (paramArtha-satya) which characterizes statements that disclose the true nature of things and by which we may describe the ultimate reality.

It might be stated, for example, that the achievement of nirvana will lead to the person exiting samsara, and this could be understood under a conventional interpretation as a discussion of the fate of persons; but it could also be understood at another ‘higher’ level as using the non-referring terms ‘person’, ‘samsara,’ etc. and referring to a process that cannot occur in the way indicated. The point of making the statement to an audience that will apply the conventional interpretation is to convince the hearer that there is a reason to follow the Buddha’s teachings to the point that they will be capable of making the second interpretation. The point of the statement is therefore not to convey a truth about the world but to achieve some objective, and the point of claiming that the conventional interpretation gives a ‘conventional truth’ is no more than to validate in conventional terms the worth of the statement to the audience.

In fact, this being the case, we should say that the teachings of the Buddha are not intended to be evaluated in terms of their truth or falsity, but rather in terms of whether or not they lead to success in the Buddha’s intended project of liberation. But if this pragmatic or instrumental attitude towards truth is the proper understanding of the Buddha’s method, then his method is a very risky one, because, of course, once you have allowed that your statements are not to be thought of as true in the ‘standard’ way – even if you now insist that this statement is true in that way – it becomes impossible to make any statement that the audience may reasonably be expected to accept at face value. Even statements of so-called ‘ultimate truths’ may be suspected of being only instrumentally true rather than truly true; and we cannot know what the statements are instrumental for: the Buddha may state that he intends to end suffering and that his teachings are directed towards that end; but maybe that’s just a statement intended to lead us to behave or believe in a certain way, and doesn’t describe Buddha’s real intentions. Who can tell?

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Mín Pronouns

January 14, 2021 – 8:45 am

Here are mín preferred pronouns. Ic am currently identifying as masculine singular; if this changes the guide will be updated. It is your responsibility to check this noticeboard before attempting any pronominal reference to ensure compliance and avoid offence.

(The acute accent signs mark long vowel sounds. The letter ‘g’ in the pronouns listed below is permissibly pronounced either as a hard ‘g’ or as a ‘y’ sound, but must be pronounced consistently.)

First person:

Cases Singular Dual Plural
Nominative ic, ih wit wé
Genitive mín uncer úre
Dative mé unc ús
Accusative mé unc ús

Second person:

Cases Singular Dual Plural
Nominative þú git gé
Genitive þín incer éower
Dative þé inc éow
Accusative þé inc éow

Third person:

Cases Mascu. Sing. Fem. Sing. Neut. Sing. Plural
Nominative hé héo hit híe
Genitive his hiere his hiera
Dative him hiere him him, heom
Accusative hine híe hit híe

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Zhuangzi’s Skeptical Arguments

July 12, 2020 – 10:41 am

We are familiar, I suppose, with the general arguments for skepticism in the Western tradition – if only from our memories of the Cartesian argument. There are traces of something like that same skeptical procedure in the Zhuangzi, with the notable exception of the very first step in which we are urged to doubt the veracity of our own senses. It cannot have escaped the notice of thinkers at any time that we may be mistaken about the things we believe we see or hear, and yet there is no good evidence that this was felt to be an important epistemological limit by Chinese philosophers before the introduction of Buddhism in the 1st C AD.[1]

The Problem of Dreams

Descartes’s second step was to question whether he could distinguish between the fantasies that come as dreams and the experiences that come in waking life:

How often, in the still of the night, I have the familiar conviction that I am here, wearing a cloak, sitting by the fire – when really I am undressed and lying in bed! … When I think more clearly about this, I see so plainly that sleep and waking can never be distinguished by any certain signs, that I am bewildered …[2]

And Zhuangzi made precisely the same point, though more picturesquely:

I, Chuang Chou, once dreamed that I was a butterfly flitting about. I did whatever I wanted! I knew nothing about any Chuang Chou. Then I suddenly awakened as Chuang Chou with all his normal trappings. Now I don’t know whether Chuang Chou dreamed he was a butterfly or a butterfly is dreaming that he is Chuang Chou.[3]

The Problem of Reason

Descartes recognised, however, that even if we couldn’t be sure that we were not dreaming, still there were things that were true even so. Things like red being a colour, bodies having extension, and so on. Similarly, St Augustine at this point in his own treatment of skepticism declared that we could still not doubt that logical truths were true or that mathematical or geometrical truths still held.[4]  

The Third Cartesian step was to introduce the possibility of a deceptive Demon whose power was such that it could force us to make errors even in acknowledging those facts. If you wonder how that is possible you need to simply ask yourself how it is that you are certain that 1 + 1 = 2: it isn’t by repeated experience of that being the case, because we just don’t think that we get mathematical or logical truths by extrapolating from experience. (If we did, we’d have to find it conceivable that some experience could tell us that 1 + 1 = something other than 2; and we don’t. If no experience can contradict it then it wasn’t experience that told us it was true.) Apparently we just have an intuition of the truth of such matters, and an intuition, being a subjective phenomenon, has no independent guarantee of truth.

Zhuangzi has nothing like the Demon, but he does have an argument that makes the related suggestion that our intuitions about rationality are less than infallible.

Suppose that you and I debated and you bested me, would it mean that you were naturally right and I was naturally wrong? Or even vice versa? Or would one be partially right and the other partially wrong? Or would both be both right and wrong? And if you and I cannot come to a mutual understanding, others assuredly will experience the same difficulty, so who can we get to set things straight? Anybody agreeing with me will only repeat my own arguments, and we shall still be in the dark. Somebody differing with both of us merely offers another point of view, and somebody agreeing with both of us brings us back to the starting point. So, if neither you nor I nor another man can come to a mutual understanding, shall we await a fourth?[5]

And if we cannot rely upon the results of reasoned argument any more than we can rely upon our experience of the world (which may be just a dream,) then it must seem that there is no way to be sure of how things are.

[1] Graham, A. C. (1989) Disputers of the Tao, Open Court, p. 84

[2] Descartes, R. Meditations I (Anscombe & Geach (1954) Descartes: Philosophical Writings, London: Thomas Nelson, p. 62)

[3] Zz 2.95

[4] Augustine, Against the Academicians, 3.10.23

[5] Zz 2.85 ff

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Hui Shi

July 2, 2020 – 8:23 am

The Dialectician Hui Shi (Huizi) (??, 370-310 BC) is mentioned in several ancient works, like the Hanfeizi and the Xunzi that have been mentioned before, but especially in the Zhuangzi. In that work he is presented as a friend of Zhuang Zhou and a foil for his jests. In c. 17 it is claimed that he was the chancellor to king Hui of Wei, which, if true, would make him one of the more successful of the classical philosophers – at least until he had to flee that state to avoid falling into the power of the rising Qin state. Other texts paint an unflattering portrait of arrogance and frivolity and wilful error, but that is probably no more than ad hominem abuse intended to prevent his arguments being considered seriously.

The Ten Theses

In c. 33 of the Zhuangzi, amongst many other bizarre claims attributed to the Dialecticians, are Ten Theses attributed to Hui Shi:

Hui Shih was a man of many devices and his writings would fill five carriages. But his doctrines were jumbled and perverse and his words wide of the mark. His way of dealing with things may be seen from these sayings:

  1. “The largest thing has nothing beyond it; it is called the One of largeness. The smallest thing has nothing within it; it is called the One of smallness.”
  2. “That which has no thickness cannot be piled up; yet it is a thousand liin dimension.”
  3. “Heaven is as low as earth; mountains and marshes are on the same level.”
  4. “The sun at noon is the sun setting. The thing born is the thing dying.”
  5. “Great similarities are different from little similarities; these are called the little similarities and differences. The ten thousand things are all similar and are all different; these are called the great similarities and differences.”
  6. “The southern region has no limit and yet has a limit.”
  7. “I set off for Yueh today and came there yesterday.”
  8. “Linked rings can be separated.”
  9. “I know the centre of the world: it is north of Yen and south of Yueh.”
  10. “Let love embrace the ten thousand things; Heaven and earth are a single body.”

With sayings such as these, Hui Shih tried to introduce a more magnanimous view of the world and to enlighten the rhetoricians.[1]

At first sight these don’t seem very philosophically promising, and of course, we don’t have the explanations of Hui Shi himself to give them context or meaning. On the assumption that there is a meaning to them, various interpretations have been suggested. Of course any reasonable interpretation will have to satisfy a few obvious criteria: it has to be plausible that the interpretation could have been intended by the author – for example, it can’t have the theses stating obvious absurdities, and it can’t depend upon a degree of philosophical sophistication far beyond or beneath the level known to have been reached at the time; it should integrate the theses making them coherent as a group; it should be consistent; it should respect what the theses actually say while making allowance for poor phrasing by the original authors, mischaracterization by the recorders, or simple errors in remembrance.[2] An interpretation which seems reasonable in these terms is presented here, but it is far from the only possibility.

What The Ten Theses Mean

There’s no reason to believe that the theses are presented by Zhuangzi in any deliberate order, but they do seem to fall into three groups dealing with distinct matters. The first two theses seem to be concerned with technical matters of the theory of space.

  1. If we suppose that the largest thing has something beyond it, then if we added that to the largest thing we would make something larger than the largest thing. The One of largeness is the whole universe. We do not doubt that the whole universe exists.
    Similarly, if the smallest thing had anything within it then that thing would be smaller than the smallest thing. The smallest thing, or the One of smallness, we would have to think of as being a dimensionless point. There must be a smallest thing, therefore the dimensionless point exists.
    This is an important claim for mathematical considerations, and we know that the Chinese (the later Mohists in particular) did have a notion of the dimensionless point and saw it as somehow fundamental to the consideration of all spatial dimensions. In what way ‘fundamental’ is not known, but they may have held that all other dimensions were constructed from points.
  2. If it is supposed that a line, say, is constructed from dimensionless points (just as we are taught in our own primary schooling,) then we have a problem in understanding how any accumulation of things of zero length can give rise to something with a length of a thousand li. If it turns out that such a construction is impossible, then the possibility of spatial dimensions is rendered once more a mystery.

The next seven theses seem to be concerned with matters of relativism, conventionalism, etc., and the impossibility of using the evidence of what can be said about the world as a guide to what is true of the world.

  1. Terms like ‘high’ and ‘low’ are strictly relative. We are used to this when we say that ‘Heaven is higher than Earth’ but when we say ‘Heaven is high’ we need to say high in relation to what. It’s like saying that ‘Dumbo is a small elephant’ or ‘Jerry is a big mouse’ they make sense if we understand that ‘small’ is in reference to other elephants or ‘big’ is in reference to other mice, but without those references the terms are meaningless. With respect to what is Heaven high or Earth low? With respect to where the observer is standing? But where is the observer? Different observers are going to be justified in making different judgements. If I am in Heaven then it is at my level and if I am on Earth then it is at my level. It is possible for different people to say that Heaven or Earth is at their level and in fact all statements about the heights and lows of Heaven and Earth can be true.
    The point of this might be to say that none of our judgements of such qualities have justifications in the way things really are.
  2. From the moment one is born one is moving towards ones death. To be moving towards ones death is to be dying. Therefore from the moment one is born one is dying. The same applies to the sun: from the moment it reaches its highest point it is moving towards the Western horizon. It is setting. In fact, this would be just as true, and more like its pair in the thesis, if we spoke of the sun setting from the moment it rose.
    The point of this observation seems to be that our temporal distinctions amongst events are conventional and have no justification in the ways things really are.
  3. ‘The ten thousand things’ just means everything. It’s easy to see that anything is similar in some respect to any other thing – at the very least they are similar in both being things. But it’s also clear that anything is different from any other thing – otherwise they would be the same thing. So everything is similar and everything is different. The similarities and differences that account for multiple things existing in the world are the Great similarities and differences.
    On the other hand, we group together things that have a lot of similarities (like ‘dogs’ for example) to form a class of things, and we distinguish them from other classes of things (like tables, for example) by the differences that we see. These similarities and differences are less than the Great similarities and differences: we call them the Small similarities and differences.
    The point of this may be to minimize the significance of the classifications that we make amongst the 10,000 things by suggesting that they are merely conventional and not reflective of reality.
  4. That ‘the South has no limit’ was apparently a saying of the time[3] and simply meant that as far as was known there was no end to the South, no natural ocean or desert or mountain frontier. But even if that were the case the South could not be limitless because it would then be infinite in extent and would have to include all the regions of the world. (If it didn’t contain all the regions of the world then there would be limits between the South and them.) On the other hand, the fact that we want to distinguish the South from other regions does not indicate how those limits should be set. Perhaps once again the point is being made that our divisions of the world are arbitrary and not grounded in reality.
  5. Indexical terms – like the terms ‘this’ and ‘that,’ or like the relative terms mentioned above –are notoriously difficult to handle in semantic analysis. In this case it was true to say, when I left home, that ‘Today I set off for Yueh;’ but it is equally true to say now, having arrived and reflecting upon the journey, that ‘Yesterday I came there.’ The problem is that I can’t arrive before I leave and yet the two true sentences indicate that I did.
    The point of such a paradox may have been to demonstrate that these sorts of indexical terms, which allow contradictory statements to be true, cannot properly describe the world, and therefore statements using ‘this,’ ‘that,’ ‘now,’ ‘then,’ ‘here,’ ‘there’ etc. to make distinctions amongst things in the world cannot be true (or trusted.)
  6. The matter of the linked rings has been the hardest to make sense of, but if we wished to continue the general theme of relativism and conventionalism in language we could say that the claim is that from one point of view two interlocked rings are a single thing in as much as it is true that where one part goes the other part must go too; but from another point of view the interlocked rings are, as we say, rings (plural,) two separate things. Thus plurality or unity is a matter of perspective and not a matter of how the world really is.
  7. For each person the centre of their world is just where they are, thus some who are north of the Northern state of Yen will find the centre there, and some south of the Southern state of Yueh will find it there. This is just another version of the problem of indexicals that we say in the 7th thesis and with the same significance.

The last of the theses gives us a practical consequence that must follow from accepting the preceding seven theses.

  1. If we are not justified in supposing that language accurately represents the way that the world really is, and if we are not justified in supposing that the divisions of the world that language describes are the real divisions of the world, and if we are perhaps not justified in believing then that there are any divisions that we can know of, then our attitude to the ten thousand things must be completely impartial. How could we justify preferring some things to others? That would be to suppose a real division.

One might have thought that this demonstration of the significance of their investigations for ethical practice might have gained the Dialecticians some credit in the eyes of the other schools, but unhappily it was not so.

[1] Zz 33 (Watson, B. (1968) The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 374)

[2] The reason these conditions are given at some length is that they apply to a great deal of what historians of philosophy study. It’s worth reminding oneself of this from time to time.

[3] Fung Yu-Lan (1964) A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, NY: Macmillan, p. 86

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Les Achéens dans l’ouest d’anatolie

January 10, 2020 – 11:33 pm

Les historiens pensent maintenant que la chute d’Hattušas était finalement provoquée par une révolte interne plutôt que par des attaques par des ennemies externes. L’effet des pressions externes aurait plutôt été de créer des circonstances qui pouvait mener à un mécontentement avec l’empire dans la population subjuguée, à une croyance qu’une révolte fût possible, et enfin à une faiblesse au centre de l’empire qui invitait à une révolte.

Parmi ces pressions externes il y avaient des perturbations a l’extrême Ouest de l’empire. Sur cette question nous avons maintenant le témoignage des lettres diplomatiques du bureau des affaires étrangères de l’empire Hittite. Nous découvrons de ceux-ci, que l’empire avait été en conflit depuis un certain temps avec une puissance appelée ‘Ahhiyawa’. Depuis longtemps ce nom a été proposé pour être la forme Hittite du nom ‘Achée’ qui est un des noms par lesquels Homère connaissait les Grecs qui avaient attaqués Troie. Il est aussi en outre, comme c’est mentionné ci-dessus, accepté d’être le nom du peuple que les Egyptiens appelaient ‘l’Aqweš’. 

Les lettres indiquent qu’on devait adresser le roi d’Ahhiyawa (la plupart du temps) comme ‘Grand Roi’ en reconnaissance de son pouvoir et son honneur étant égal à ceux des autres grandes puissances du monde. Si ceci n’est pas de la flatterie, et c’est probable que c’en n’est pas, on peut alors suggérer en plus qu’Ahhiyawa est une plus grande puissance (elle pouvait mettre en champ de bataille cent chars, par exemple) qu’aucun des petits états mycéniens individuels n’ait pu l’égaler.  C’est donc bien probable qu’Ahhiyawa était une confédération de petits états sous la commande d’un Commandant Suprême, et ici on pense bien sûr du rôle d’Agamemnon chez les Grecs d’Homère. Il y avait des autres coalitions que les Hittites ont reconnues comme des puissances ou des ennemies ; par exemple l’Arzawa ou l’Assuwa d’un temps antérieur qui avaient aussi lancés des défis aux Hittites dans l’ouest. (‘Assuwa’ est l’origine de ‘Asie’, qui n’était à l’origine qu’un terme pour la petite région autour de la capitale de la coalition Apasa – c’est à dire Éphèse.)

Desormais, c’est certain que la raison pour laquelle la majorité des historiens se sont intéressées à Ahhiyawa (Achée), c’est que dans les archives hittites nous trouvons cet état impliqué dans des conflits avec un lieu nommé ‘Wilusa’ qui était associé avec un autre lieu non loin de là, nommé ‘Taruisa’ qui avait un roi appelé ‘Alaksandu’, et tout le monde pensait que ces noms suggèraient les noms d’Ilios (Wilios en grec archaïque), un autre nom pour Troie chez Homère, dont le prince était Alexandre (un autre nom pour Paris). Si on pouvait accepter ces équivalences, on pourrait espérer de trouver des traces de la guerre historique de Troie dans ces écritures. Par ailleurs, de notre point de vue, la conséquence la plus intéressante doit être que les Achéens (d’Ahhiyawa) qui étaient un grand peuple comparable aux Assyriens, avaient décliné dans de telles mesures que, comme l’Aqweš, ils sont devenus rien de plus qu’un peuple de pilleur dans le delta d’Egypte.

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Interstellar Exploration System: First Contact Protocol

November 11, 2019 – 9:41 pm

Assumptions:

  1. IXS Basic Protocol of Operations has been followed
  2. Extra-terrestrial intelligences (ETI) are discovered at the latest by orbital scan operations (their planet is ETIP) and are not technologically sophisticated (have no spacefaring or close observational capability)
  3. IXS is expected to begin Contact procedures where possible
  1. Principles:
    1. It is the responsibility of the IXS to minimise the likelihood of harm to Humanity
      1. The survival of the IXS is secondary to this
      2. The integrity of the ETI is secondary to this
    2. In so far as Contact between IXS and ETI cultures is judged likely to be eventually mutually enriching, the establishment of Contact with ETI is justified
      1. The judgement is to be made by the IXS
      2. The judgement is to be made according to criteria established by the IXS
    3. It is the responsibility of the IXS, as the advantaged party, to minimise the likelihood of harm to the ETI in the long term by Contact
      1. ‘Harm’ is understood according to criteria established by the IXS
        (Criteria of harm are not governed by the preferences of the ETI)

        1. Ethical guidelines are for the IXS not the ETI
        2. Epistemological difficulties preclude doing otherwise
      2. The extent of Contact attempted is dependent upon judgements of likely harm
        1. Nothing done pre-Contact poses excess risk of premature Contact
        2. Nothing done at the degree of Contact determined to be appropriate mandates an eventual greater degree of Contact
  2. Secundae:
    1. The cautious and thorough study of the ETI before Contact is initiated is required for the responsible application of the principles of Contact
      1. Undeclared surveillance in preparation for Contact is justified
      2. The justifiability of continued undeclared or partially declared surveillance after Contact depends on the degree of Contact and determinations of likely long term harm to ETI
    2. Whatever degree of Contact is determined to be appropriate must be approached cautiously and by all the appropriate intermediate degrees
      1. Non-interactive messages
        – ETI to become accustomed to the idea of alien presence
        – non-interactivity is intended to suggest reduced danger
      2. Interactive messaging with delay
        – ETI to become accustomed to the idea of being the target of alien interest
        – Delay is intended to continue to suggest low risk to ETI
      3. Interactive communication in real-time
        1. Mediated by non-threatening devices becoming increasingly animated
        2. Using avatar in ETI form
        3. Direct contact
    3. Disturbance to ETI society is inevitable, but avoid the possibility of become a focus of competition for access.
      1. No assistance useful in ETI competitions
      2. No agreement to restriction of contact to initial or other ETI groups
      3. No agreement to secrecy beyond that required by the Contact protocols

  3. Programme:
  1. PXS enters orbit over ETIP
    A satellite constellation has already been established and orbital scans at medium range conducted. The scans have determined the general technological level, identified population, agriculture, and urbanisation distributions.
    Note that use of F-drive is highly visible to ETI – especially HLU deployments of PHabs.
  2. Based on continuing orbital scans, determine whether planetary probes (P-probes) may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of detection by ETI.
    1. The potential for harm of such disturbance cannot at this point be evaluated
    2. Purpose is close investigation of planet
    3. Possible P-probes placed by SLU are
      1. solid surface (including ice)
      2. aerial
      3. marine/submarine rovers
  3. Based on continuing orbital scans and possible P-probes, determine the optimal mode of despatch for ETI probes (E-probes.)
    1. E-probes are micro probes that are able to study the ETI at close range without detection.
      1. E-probes operate in swarms
      2. E-probe swarms communicate with / coordinate via local base units (EPBU)
      3. EPBU communicate with / coordinate via OHab
    2. E-probe concerns are
      1. Language
      2. Psychology
      3. Customs
      4. Politics
    3. E-probes are now the primary mission, their dispatch is required in all but the most extremely risky (to ETI) circumstances
    4. E-probes are dispatched to the area(s) hosting the most advanced ETI civilisation as determined by preceding scans and P-probes
    5. E-probes and their base units are despatched using SLU (with F-drives)
  4. Based on continuing orbital scans and analysis of E-probe data, reconsider whether P-probes may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of detection by ETI.
    1. The potential for harm of such disturbance is now better understood
  5. Based on analysis of E-probe data, determine that Contact messaging procedures may commence.
    1. Particularities of these procedures are contingent on the nature of the ETI and its environment
    2. At the earliest opportunity request a Special Contact System (SCS) including Ambassadorial Team (AT)
  6. Based on continuing orbital scans and analysis of E-probe data, determine whether PHabs may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of harm to ETI.
    1. The potential for harm of such action can at this point be evaluated
    2. If required request Aerial or Submersible Support Systems (ASS, SSS) from CS
      1. Those systems are delivered to ETIP before the PHab is despatched
    3. PHab deployed by HLU
    4. PHab is not a settlement core
      1. Ethical prohibition on uninvited settlement
      2. Minimal distractions from research activities
      3. Minimal impact on planetary environment
      4. Maximum potential for relocation
      5. Maximum potential for evacuation to prevent impact on ETI
      6. Resupplied by deliveries from OHab
      7. Crews rotate between PHab and OHab by SLS
    5. Establishes base for intense investigation of area by research team
      1. Principal function is assistance in coordination of ETI probes (E-probe) operations and preparation for Direct Contact
      2. Crewed rovers
      3. Deep excavation
    6. PHab may be relocated by HLU
  7. Retrieve all P-probes and E-probes by SLU
  8. Sanitise areas of operations
  9. Retrieve PHab and any ASS or SSS by HLU
  10. Depart orbit and transit to CS

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