Steve Watson

Hui Shi

July 2, 2020 – 8:23 am

The Dialectician Hui Shi (Huizi) (??, 370-310 BC) is mentioned in several ancient works, like the Hanfeizi and the Xunzi that have been mentioned before, but especially in the Zhuangzi. In that work he is presented as a friend of Zhuang Zhou and a foil for his jests. In c. 17 it is claimed that he was the chancellor to king Hui of Wei, which, if true, would make him one of the more successful of the classical philosophers – at least until he had to flee that state to avoid falling into the power of the rising Qin state. Other texts paint an unflattering portrait of arrogance and frivolity and wilful error, but that is probably no more than ad hominem abuse intended to prevent his arguments being considered seriously.

The Ten Theses

In c. 33 of the Zhuangzi, amongst many other bizarre claims attributed to the Dialecticians, are Ten Theses attributed to Hui Shi:

Hui Shih was a man of many devices and his writings would fill five carriages. But his doctrines were jumbled and perverse and his words wide of the mark. His way of dealing with things may be seen from these sayings:

1. “The largest thing has nothing beyond it; it is called the One of largeness. The smallest thing has nothing within it; it is called the One of smallness.”
2. “That which has no thickness cannot be piled up; yet it is a thousand liin dimension.”
3. “Heaven is as low as earth; mountains and marshes are on the same level.”
4. “The sun at noon is the sun setting. The thing born is the thing dying.”
5. “Great similarities are different from little similarities; these are called the little similarities and differences. The ten thousand things are all similar and are all different; these are called the great similarities and differences.”
6. “The southern region has no limit and yet has a limit.”
7. “I set off for Yueh today and came there yesterday.”
8. “Linked rings can be separated.”
9. “I know the centre of the world: it is north of Yen and south of Yueh.”
10. “Let love embrace the ten thousand things; Heaven and earth are a single body.”

With sayings such as these, Hui Shih tried to introduce a more magnanimous view of the world and to enlighten the rhetoricians.[1]

At first sight these don’t seem very philosophically promising, and of course, we don’t have the explanations of Hui Shi himself to give them context or meaning. On the assumption that there is a meaning to them, various interpretations have been suggested. Of course any reasonable interpretation will have to satisfy a few obvious criteria: it has to be plausible that the interpretation could have been intended by the author – for example, it can’t have the theses stating obvious absurdities, and it can’t depend upon a degree of philosophical sophistication far beyond or beneath the level known to have been reached at the time; it should integrate the theses making them coherent as a group; it should be consistent; it should respect what the theses actually say while making allowance for poor phrasing by the original authors, mischaracterization by the recorders, or simple errors in remembrance.[2] An interpretation which seems reasonable in these terms is presented here, but it is far from the only possibility.

What The Ten Theses Mean

There’s no reason to believe that the theses are presented by Zhuangzi in any deliberate order, but they do seem to fall into three groups dealing with distinct matters. The first two theses seem to be concerned with technical matters of the theory of space.

1. If we suppose that the largest thing has something beyond it, then if we added that to the largest thing we would make something larger than the largest thing. The One of largeness is the whole universe. We do not doubt that the whole universe exists.
   Similarly, if the smallest thing had anything within it then that thing would be smaller than the smallest thing. The smallest thing, or the One of smallness, we would have to think of as being a dimensionless point. There must be a smallest thing, therefore the dimensionless point exists.
   This is an important claim for mathematical considerations, and we know that the Chinese (the later Mohists in particular) did have a notion of the dimensionless point and saw it as somehow fundamental to the consideration of all spatial dimensions. In what way ‘fundamental’ is not known, but they may have held that all other dimensions were constructed from points.
2. If it is supposed that a line, say, is constructed from dimensionless points (just as we are taught in our own primary schooling,) then we have a problem in understanding how any accumulation of things of zero length can give rise to something with a length of a thousand li. If it turns out that such a construction is impossible, then the possibility of spatial dimensions is rendered once more a mystery.

The next seven theses seem to be concerned with matters of relativism, conventionalism, etc., and the impossibility of using the evidence of what can be said about the world as a guide to what is true of the world.

1. Terms like ‘high’ and ‘low’ are strictly relative. We are used to this when we say that ‘Heaven is higher than Earth’ but when we say ‘Heaven is high’ we need to say high in relation to what. It’s like saying that ‘Dumbo is a small elephant’ or ‘Jerry is a big mouse’ they make sense if we understand that ‘small’ is in reference to other elephants or ‘big’ is in reference to other mice, but without those references the terms are meaningless. With respect to what is Heaven high or Earth low? With respect to where the observer is standing? But where is the observer? Different observers are going to be justified in making different judgements. If I am in Heaven then it is at my level and if I am on Earth then it is at my level. It is possible for different people to say that Heaven or Earth is at their level and in fact all statements about the heights and lows of Heaven and Earth can be true.
   The point of this might be to say that none of our judgements of such qualities have justifications in the way things really are.
2. From the moment one is born one is moving towards ones death. To be moving towards ones death is to be dying. Therefore from the moment one is born one is dying. The same applies to the sun: from the moment it reaches its highest point it is moving towards the Western horizon. It is setting. In fact, this would be just as true, and more like its pair in the thesis, if we spoke of the sun setting from the moment it rose.
   The point of this observation seems to be that our temporal distinctions amongst events are conventional and have no justification in the ways things really are.
3. ‘The ten thousand things’ just means everything. It’s easy to see that anything is similar in some respect to any other thing – at the very least they are similar in both being things. But it’s also clear that anything is different from any other thing – otherwise they would be the same thing. So everything is similar and everything is different. The similarities and differences that account for multiple things existing in the world are the Great similarities and differences.
   On the other hand, we group together things that have a lot of similarities (like ‘dogs’ for example) to form a class of things, and we distinguish them from other classes of things (like tables, for example) by the differences that we see. These similarities and differences are less than the Great similarities and differences: we call them the Small similarities and differences.
   The point of this may be to minimize the significance of the classifications that we make amongst the 10,000 things by suggesting that they are merely conventional and not reflective of reality.
4. That ‘the South has no limit’ was apparently a saying of the time[3] and simply meant that as far as was known there was no end to the South, no natural ocean or desert or mountain frontier. But even if that were the case the South could not be limitless because it would then be infinite in extent and would have to include all the regions of the world. (If it didn’t contain all the regions of the world then there would be limits between the South and them.) On the other hand, the fact that we want to distinguish the South from other regions does not indicate how those limits should be set. Perhaps once again the point is being made that our divisions of the world are arbitrary and not grounded in reality.
5. Indexical terms – like the terms ‘this’ and ‘that,’ or like the relative terms mentioned above –are notoriously difficult to handle in semantic analysis. In this case it was true to say, when I left home, that ‘Today I set off for Yueh;’ but it is equally true to say now, having arrived and reflecting upon the journey, that ‘Yesterday I came there.’ The problem is that I can’t arrive before I leave and yet the two true sentences indicate that I did.
   The point of such a paradox may have been to demonstrate that these sorts of indexical terms, which allow contradictory statements to be true, cannot properly describe the world, and therefore statements using ‘this,’ ‘that,’ ‘now,’ ‘then,’ ‘here,’ ‘there’ etc. to make distinctions amongst things in the world cannot be true (or trusted.)
6. The matter of the linked rings has been the hardest to make sense of, but if we wished to continue the general theme of relativism and conventionalism in language we could say that the claim is that from one point of view two interlocked rings are a single thing in as much as it is true that where one part goes the other part must go too; but from another point of view the interlocked rings are, as we say, rings (plural,) two separate things. Thus plurality or unity is a matter of perspective and not a matter of how the world really is.
7. For each person the centre of their world is just where they are, thus some who are north of the Northern state of Yen will find the centre there, and some south of the Southern state of Yueh will find it there. This is just another version of the problem of indexicals that we say in the 7^th thesis and with the same significance.

The last of the theses gives us a practical consequence that must follow from accepting the preceding seven theses.

1. If we are not justified in supposing that language accurately represents the way that the world really is, and if we are not justified in supposing that the divisions of the world that language describes are the real divisions of the world, and if we are perhaps not justified in believing then that there are any divisions that we can know of, then our attitude to the ten thousand things must be completely impartial. How could we justify preferring some things to others? That would be to suppose a real division.

One might have thought that this demonstration of the significance of their investigations for ethical practice might have gained the Dialecticians some credit in the eyes of the other schools, but unhappily it was not so.

[1] Zz 33 (Watson, B. (1968) The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 374)

[2] The reason these conditions are given at some length is that they apply to a great deal of what historians of philosophy study. It’s worth reminding oneself of this from time to time.

[3] Fung Yu-Lan (1964) A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, NY: Macmillan, p. 86

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Les Achéens dans l’ouest d’anatolie

January 10, 2020 – 11:33 pm

Les historiens pensent maintenant que la chute d’Hattušas était finalement provoquée par une révolte interne plutôt que par des attaques par des ennemies externes. L’effet des pressions externes aurait plutôt été de créer des circonstances qui pouvait mener à un mécontentement avec l’empire dans la population subjuguée, à une croyance qu’une révolte fût possible, et enfin à une faiblesse au centre de l’empire qui invitait à une révolte.

Parmi ces pressions externes il y avaient des perturbations a l’extrême Ouest de l’empire. Sur cette question nous avons maintenant le témoignage des lettres diplomatiques du bureau des affaires étrangères de l’empire Hittite. Nous découvrons de ceux-ci, que l’empire avait été en conflit depuis un certain temps avec une puissance appelée ‘Ahhiyawa’. Depuis longtemps ce nom a été proposé pour être la forme Hittite du nom ‘Achée’ qui est un des noms par lesquels Homère connaissait les Grecs qui avaient attaqués Troie. Il est aussi en outre, comme c’est mentionné ci-dessus, accepté d’être le nom du peuple que les Egyptiens appelaient ‘l’Aqweš’. 

Les lettres indiquent qu’on devait adresser le roi d’Ahhiyawa (la plupart du temps) comme ‘Grand Roi’ en reconnaissance de son pouvoir et son honneur étant égal à ceux des autres grandes puissances du monde. Si ceci n’est pas de la flatterie, et c’est probable que c’en n’est pas, on peut alors suggérer en plus qu’Ahhiyawa est une plus grande puissance (elle pouvait mettre en champ de bataille cent chars, par exemple) qu’aucun des petits états mycéniens individuels n’ait pu l’égaler.  C’est donc bien probable qu’Ahhiyawa était une confédération de petits états sous la commande d’un Commandant Suprême, et ici on pense bien sûr du rôle d’Agamemnon chez les Grecs d’Homère. Il y avait des autres coalitions que les Hittites ont reconnues comme des puissances ou des ennemies ; par exemple l’Arzawa ou l’Assuwa d’un temps antérieur qui avaient aussi lancés des défis aux Hittites dans l’ouest. (‘Assuwa’ est l’origine de ‘Asie’, qui n’était à l’origine qu’un terme pour la petite région autour de la capitale de la coalition Apasa – c’est à dire Éphèse.)

Desormais, c’est certain que la raison pour laquelle la majorité des historiens se sont intéressées à Ahhiyawa (Achée), c’est que dans les archives hittites nous trouvons cet état impliqué dans des conflits avec un lieu nommé ‘Wilusa’ qui était associé avec un autre lieu non loin de là, nommé ‘Taruisa’ qui avait un roi appelé ‘Alaksandu’, et tout le monde pensait que ces noms suggèraient les noms d’Ilios (Wilios en grec archaïque), un autre nom pour Troie chez Homère, dont le prince était Alexandre (un autre nom pour Paris). Si on pouvait accepter ces équivalences, on pourrait espérer de trouver des traces de la guerre historique de Troie dans ces écritures. Par ailleurs, de notre point de vue, la conséquence la plus intéressante doit être que les Achéens (d’Ahhiyawa) qui étaient un grand peuple comparable aux Assyriens, avaient décliné dans de telles mesures que, comme l’Aqweš, ils sont devenus rien de plus qu’un peuple de pilleur dans le delta d’Egypte.

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Interstellar Exploration System: First Contact Protocol

November 11, 2019 – 9:41 pm

Assumptions:

1. IXS Basic Protocol of Operations has been followed
2. Extra-terrestrial intelligences (ETI) are discovered at the latest by orbital scan operations (their planet is ETIP) and are not technologically sophisticated (have no spacefaring or close observational capability)
3. IXS is expected to begin Contact procedures where possible

1. Principles:
   1. It is the responsibility of the IXS to minimise the likelihood of harm to Humanity
      1. The survival of the IXS is secondary to this
      2. The integrity of the ETI is secondary to this
   2. In so far as Contact between IXS and ETI cultures is judged likely to be eventually mutually enriching, the establishment of Contact with ETI is justified
      1. The judgement is to be made by the IXS
      2. The judgement is to be made according to criteria established by the IXS
   3. It is the responsibility of the IXS, as the advantaged party, to minimise the likelihood of harm to the ETI in the long term by Contact
      1. ‘Harm’ is understood according to criteria established by the IXS
         (Criteria of harm are not governed by the preferences of the ETI)
         1. Ethical guidelines are for the IXS not the ETI
         2. Epistemological difficulties preclude doing otherwise
      2. The extent of Contact attempted is dependent upon judgements of likely harm
         1. Nothing done pre-Contact poses excess risk of premature Contact
         2. Nothing done at the degree of Contact determined to be appropriate mandates an eventual greater degree of Contact
2. Secundae:
   1. The cautious and thorough study of the ETI before Contact is initiated is required for the responsible application of the principles of Contact
      1. Undeclared surveillance in preparation for Contact is justified
      2. The justifiability of continued undeclared or partially declared surveillance after Contact depends on the degree of Contact and determinations of likely long term harm to ETI
   2. Whatever degree of Contact is determined to be appropriate must be approached cautiously and by all the appropriate intermediate degrees
      1. Non-interactive messages
         – ETI to become accustomed to the idea of alien presence
         – non-interactivity is intended to suggest reduced danger
      2. Interactive messaging with delay
         – ETI to become accustomed to the idea of being the target of alien interest
         – Delay is intended to continue to suggest low risk to ETI
      3. Interactive communication in real-time
         1. Mediated by non-threatening devices becoming increasingly animated
         2. Using avatar in ETI form
         3. Direct contact
   3. Disturbance to ETI society is inevitable, but avoid the possibility of become a focus of competition for access.
      1. No assistance useful in ETI competitions
      2. No agreement to restriction of contact to initial or other ETI groups
      3. No agreement to secrecy beyond that required by the Contact protocols

3. Programme:

1. PXS enters orbit over ETIP
   A satellite constellation has already been established and orbital scans at medium range conducted. The scans have determined the general technological level, identified population, agriculture, and urbanisation distributions.
   Note that use of F-drive is highly visible to ETI – especially HLU deployments of PHabs.
2. Based on continuing orbital scans, determine whether planetary probes (P-probes) may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of detection by ETI.
   1. The potential for harm of such disturbance cannot at this point be evaluated
   2. Purpose is close investigation of planet
   3. Possible P-probes placed by SLU are
      1. solid surface (including ice)
      2. aerial
      3. marine/submarine rovers
3. Based on continuing orbital scans and possible P-probes, determine the optimal mode of despatch for ETI probes (E-probes.)
   1. E-probes are micro probes that are able to study the ETI at close range without detection.
      1. E-probes operate in swarms
      2. E-probe swarms communicate with / coordinate via local base units (EPBU)
      3. EPBU communicate with / coordinate via OHab
   2. E-probe concerns are
      1. Language
      2. Psychology
      3. Customs
      4. Politics
   3. E-probes are now the primary mission, their dispatch is required in all but the most extremely risky (to ETI) circumstances
   4. E-probes are dispatched to the area(s) hosting the most advanced ETI civilisation as determined by preceding scans and P-probes
   5. E-probes and their base units are despatched using SLU (with F-drives)
4. Based on continuing orbital scans and analysis of E-probe data, reconsider whether P-probes may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of detection by ETI.
   1. The potential for harm of such disturbance is now better understood
5. Based on analysis of E-probe data, determine that Contact messaging procedures may commence.
   1. Particularities of these procedures are contingent on the nature of the ETI and its environment
   2. At the earliest opportunity request a Special Contact System (SCS) including Ambassadorial Team (AT)
6. Based on continuing orbital scans and analysis of E-probe data, determine whether PHabs may be despatched to conduct operations without excess risk of harm to ETI.
   1. The potential for harm of such action can at this point be evaluated
   2. If required request Aerial or Submersible Support Systems (ASS, SSS) from CS
      1. Those systems are delivered to ETIP before the PHab is despatched
   3. PHab deployed by HLU
   4. PHab is not a settlement core
      1. Ethical prohibition on uninvited settlement
      2. Minimal distractions from research activities
      3. Minimal impact on planetary environment
      4. Maximum potential for relocation
      5. Maximum potential for evacuation to prevent impact on ETI
      6. Resupplied by deliveries from OHab
      7. Crews rotate between PHab and OHab by SLS
   5. Establishes base for intense investigation of area by research team
      1. Principal function is assistance in coordination of ETI probes (E-probe) operations and preparation for Direct Contact
      2. Crewed rovers
      3. Deep excavation
   6. PHab may be relocated by HLU
7. Retrieve all P-probes and E-probes by SLU
8. Sanitise areas of operations
9. Retrieve PHab and any ASS or SSS by HLU
10. Depart orbit and transit to CS

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Non-Western Philosophies in the Academy

November 4, 2019 – 11:09 am

This morning I listened to a Philosopher’s Zone podcast (our ABC) ‘Philosophy in the Wake of Empire: The White Way to Think‘ featuring B W van Norden (a famous student of Chinese philosophy – I’m currently reading his ‘Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy’) talking about the failure of Western Philosophy to take seriously non-Western philosophy, explaining why that’s a problem, and proposing ways to improve the situation. At least, that’s what he could have been doing. No, what he was actually doing was accusing philosophers in the West of systematic racism, collaborating with racist systems of colonialist and imperialist subjugation, and so on. I have some comments.

First. I doubt that the failure to take Chinese or Indian philosophy seriously has any relationship to imperialism or colonialism. The problem for this thesis is the same as that for Said’s similar assertions in ‘Orientalism’ – quoted approvingly by vN – and that is that non-(relevantly-)imperial powers, such as Germany or Russia, were equally dismissive in the same period. Moreover, the scholars of the (relevantly-)imperial powers were clearly fascinated by the cultures of the peoples they were conquering. Some had low opinions of them, but they were hardly ill-informed. Some were ‘racist’ and ‘euro-centric’ and so on, but that’s not a systematic failing, and no number of anecdotes about unfortunate opinions will make it so. We could at least entertain the idea that if they found little philosophically worthy in those alien traditions it was an honestly made judgement.

Second. It really is not a trivial question to determine that something does or does not count as philosophy (or, if it does, as *good* philosophy.) vN says that alien philosophies were diminished by putting them into the categories of ‘wisdom literature’ or ‘religion’ and so on – and the suggestion is that this is both unjust and malicious. Really. And yet it is one of the repeated caveats made by introductions to Chinese philosophy that we have to read it differently from the familiar Western philosophy because it seems to lack argument and conversational engagement with other philosophers in its own tradition, and seems also to lack argumentative development and defence of the ideas proposed. Of course, this is not universally true, and Mencius and Xunzi are consciously and explicitly reacting to others; but read Confucius or Laozi and any number of others and the difficulty will be quite clear. On the other hand the Indian philosophers are much more like our own; but they very much *are* in a religious tradition, and their philosophy is vitiated for the modern mind in precisely the way and to the degree that Mediaeval Scholastic and Islamic philosophy are: they all make assumptions that we are not prepared to grant and are concerned with problems we don’t care about.

Third. It is not the role of Philosophy to concern itself with questions of inclusiveness or diversity or any of the other buzzworthy notions. Philosophy sets its own goals, and they are (in its view anyway) to investigate the fundamental questions that are of interest to Mankind and which cannot be answered by Science (or to determine whether those questions are coherent.) Western, or should I simply say Modern, Philosophy has through long centuries developed a set of questions with which it concerns itself; it has explored and dismissed or adopted a set of answers to those question, or it has explored and dismissed or adopted a set of approaches to those questions. Alien philosophers and their ideas will be accepted into the Modern project if they can be found to answer to the needs of that project as defined by modern philosophers; but can we be sure that alien philosophies – even supposing they are identifiable – can be integrated into that project? The adoptions and dismissals and so on of modern philosophy are not independent of the processes by which the explorations were conducted: in fact the methods of modern philosophy are an essential part of the project. Alien philosophies have their own approaches, methods, etc. which it is not obvious must be compatible with the historically developed modern project.

Those who wish to make alien philosophies part of the modern project will need to demonstrate that it is possible and worthwhile. This is not a task that can be fairly imposed on those trained in modern philosophy. The investment in time and effort that is required to become passably familiar with the concepts, arguments, and other cultural background involved in another civilisation’s philosophy is not trivial – and that’s even before considering the necessity to become familiar with historical languages. The responsibility, should there be any, must fall on those who claim that it is worth doing, and have the background in the alien philosophies to make the case. In the meantime, those who are interested can continue their studies into alien philosophies with the same purpose and respectability as those who study Greek, Roman, or Mediaeval Western philosophy. Those studies too are independent of and mostly irrelevant to modern philosophy – and they too have clearly not been dismissed for the sorts of reasons vN was talking about. They continue to have a place in philosophy departments (when they do) almost entirely because of tradition.

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Xunzi

October 31, 2019 – 11:38 pm

Introduction

The Mencian claim that human nature is good eventually became the accepted position in Confucianism, but for over twelve hundred years the question was disputed with the followers of Xunzi (??) who argued the opposite: that human nature was essentially bad. Xunzi, whose name was actually Xún Kuàng (??,) is yet another of those early characters whose histories are not very well known – but at least we can be sure of his having existed. His dates are probably something like 310 BC- 220 BC. In Sima Qian’s ‘Records of the Historian’ (c. 74) he is said to have been born in the state of Zhao, and to have gone at the age of fifty (or 15) to join the Ji Xia Academy in the state of Qi, a briefly brilliant institution which attracted many of the philosophers of the Hundred Schools during the Warring States Period, and which we might compare for its influence to the Library of Alexandria in Egypt or to the Nalanda Mahavihara in India. He is supposed to have had as students both Han Fei, whom we have met as the great theorist of the Legalist school, and Li Si, who as Grand Poo Bah under the first emperor shaped many of the enduring imperial institutions (and also recommended burning books and burying scholars.) According to the histories, after his time at that school Xunzi became the usual wandering scholar seeking position. Eventually, he was employed as a minister in Lanling. When his patron there was assassinated he retired but remained in that state until his death.

Xunzi is also the name of the book that is attributed to that scholar. Actually, the book was created by the Han scholar Liu Xiang in the 1^st C AD collecting up lots of associated texts and forming 32 chapters out of them. Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that to judge from its style and content the book is indeed largely the work of a single author: 25 of the chapters are mostly or entirely his own work. Xinzi is notable for a style that is rather similar to the philosophical style that is recognised in the West, so that understanding the points being made is considerably easier for a Western reader than in other texts. He tends to write extended pieces on a single topic, to begin with a defence of his own position, and to continue with an explicit critique of the alternative positions that have been taken by such thinkers as Laozi, Mengzi, Mozi, and Zhuangzi. He is also unusual at this period in this place in having a systematic philosophy that attempts a coherent view of several areas of philosophy.

Heaven, Earth, and Man

A notable character of this philosophical system is its determined secularism. Xunzi does not deny Heaven or the Dao, but he never considers them as supernatural parts of the universe and he never appeals to supernatural forces in order to explain something that needs explaining. Concerning Heaven, he says that[1]

Heaven operates with constant regularity. It does not prevail because of [the sage king] Yao; nor does it cease to prevail because of [the tyrant] Jie. Respond to it with good government, and blessings will result; respond to it with misgovernment, and misfortune will result.

As a consequence of this view, of course, two things follow immediately. Firstly, whatever the causes of various unusual events might be, they are certainly not portents of doom or signs that Heaven is trying to communicate with Man.

When stars fall or the sacred trees groan, all the people become afraid and ask: “What is the significance of all this?” I would say: There is no special significance. This is just due to a modification of Heaven and earth and the mutation of yin and yang. These are rare phenomena. We may marvel at them, but we should not fear them.

And secondly, whatever might be the point of prayers and imprecations to Heaven, the one thing they will not do is alter the action of Heaven.

If people pray for rain and it rains, how is that? I would say: Nothing in particular. Just as when people do not pray for rain, it also rains.

It was Xunzi’s opinion that the three powers of the world – that is: Heaven, Earth, and Man – had each their own Way or dao, by which he meant a norm of operation. That is to say, there was a distinct way that each of them was supposed to act and those ways were largely independent of each other: nothing good would come from confusing them.

Heaven has its seasons; earth has its resources; man has his government. This is how man is able to form a triad with Heaven and earth. If man should neglect his own part in this triad and put all his hope in Heaven and earth with which he forms the triad, he is making a grave mistake.

The proper nature of Man’s relationship with the other two powers is one of beneficent exploitation. No doubt, the intention would be that the proper role of each power was to provide the grounds for benefits to the other two, but Xunzi only felt the need to insist upon the propriety of getting benefits from Heaven and earth.

You exalt Heaven and meditate on it: why not domesticate it and regulate it? …
You look on the seasons with expectation and await them: why not seize the seasonal opportunities and exploit them?

…

If the Way is followed and not deviated from, then Heaven cannot send misfortune. Under such circumstances, flood or drought cannot cause a famine, extreme cold or heat cannot cause any malady, and unusual apparitions cannot cause disaster.

Human Nature

The dao  of Man is thus the way of being or behaving that is optimal for Man regarding his relations with Heaven and Earth. Xunzi believed as a good Confucian that the dao for Man was that proposed by Confucius. However, it is clear whereas Heaven and Earth invariably follow their dao because that is their nature, it is equally clear that humans do not have the same advantage and that they may follow or not follow the dao that is set for them. Therefore we can say that their nature is at least not determinative of their following their dao. In this Mencius and Xunzi would doubtless agree, and the difference between them is just that Mencius believed that human nature is, nevertheless, naturally disposed to discover the true dao, whereas Xunzi thought that the true dao was not a natural disposition of human nature.

Xunzi’s arguments are well set out in chapter 23 of the Xunzi, rather bluntly titled ‘Human Nature is Detestable’ (xìng è, ??.) There are several, but the fundamental argument is from simple observation. We can see in others, as we recognise in ourselves, that what is natural to man is that he values his self-interest and, all things being equal, will pursue it. Moreover, the effect of this pursuit is to set every man against his neighbour and to make life most unpleasant for everyone.

Now people’s nature is such that they are born with a fondness for profit in them. If they follow along with this, then struggle and contention will arise, and yielding and deference will perish therein.

You may recognise this as being quite similar to Hobbes’s view of the State of Nature that existed (hypothetically) before any sovereign ruled and each man was guided by his own prudential reason. In that case the result was a life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ For Hobbes, the desire to exit the State of Nature was the justification for submission to the sovereign as the necessary condition of escape; and similarly for Xunzi, the escape from this bad condition required the acceptance of external moral codes.

It is necessary to await the transforming influence of teachers and models and the guidance of ritual and yi [righteousness,] and only then will they come to yielding and deference, turn to proper form and order, and end up becoming controlled.

It’s worth noticing at this point that both Mencius and Xunzi believed that men naturally prefer the good – if it is possible to achieve it – and both believe that man is uniquely capable of achieving it, so it might not be absolutely clear where they are in fundamental disagreement. Essentially the controversy comes down to a disagreement over what it means for some characteristic to be something’s ‘nature’ (a controversy which is not unknown also in Western philosophy.) Mencius thought that what constituted the ‘nature’ of a thing was what it was uniquely capable of doing; so the nature of Man was good, because Man uniquely possessed the four seeds of goodness that could be developed into the appropriate virtues. Xunzi thought that the nature of a member of some class was just what was universally true of all members of that class; so the nature of Man was bad because it was a universal truth that Man was guided by the love of profit, which was a tendency that was socially destructive when left uncorrected. From a distance, it might seem that the debate was a case of two schools talking past each other rather than to each other: ignoring the summary judgement on ‘human nature,’ there seems no reason why one would feel forced to choose between their positions.

Ritual

1.     Its Purpose

 a.     The Coordination of Interests

One obvious reason for the introduction of ritual was for the coordination of interests in society. This coordination has two parts. In the first place ritual was instituted in order to regulate the behaviour of people and to put limits on their perfectly rational actions to satisfy their selfish desires.

Humans are born having desires. When they have desires but do not get the objects of their desire, then they cannot but seek some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or limit to their seeking, then they cannot help but struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other there will be chaos, and if there is chaos they will be impoverished.[2]

This, again, is reminiscent of an argument made by Hobbes, who identified competition as one of the three sources of contention in the State of Nature.[3] It is usual now when discussing this problem in Hobbes to refer to the Prisoner’s Dilemma of game theory (or the older ‘Tragedy of the Commons’) in which a payoff matrix can be constructed to show how individually rational actions to maximise self-interest result in less than maximal outcomes. Consider this matrix, for example, where the cell numbers stand for years in jail:

		Citizen B
		Resist	Confess
Citizen A	Resist	1,1	20,0
	Confess	0,20	10,10

In order to escape this consequence, the sovereign is introduced to change the structure of the payoff matrix so that it does not seem to profit one to break the law.

		Citizen B
		Obey Law	Break Law
Citizen A	Obey Law	1,1	10,5
	Break Law	5,10	20,20

Xunzi’s solution, however, does not change the payoff matrix at all. He simply says that by following the rituals you will fall into the mutually beneficial behaviour desired. The question will be however, given that the human desire to pursue profit remains intact, and human reason operating upon that desire likewise, why would you follow the ritual when not doing so would be to your advantage?

So much for the first part of the coordination of interests. In the second place, it is observed that actual social cooperation (not just limits on competition) is required for Man to achieve his greatest prosperity.

The products of the hundred crafts are means to nurture a person, but even the most capable cannot engage in every craft, nor can people each fill every official post. If they live apart and do not help each other, then they will be impoverished. If they live together but have no social divisions, then they will struggle with each other. Poverty is a catastrophe and struggle is a disaster.

By the introduction of ritual, people are divided into the appropriate classes who recognise their roles in the greater society. When they recognise their roles and do not attempt to usurp the roles of other classes, then they are able to maximise their contributions to society. Farmers will farm and craftsmen will craft, while the emperor rules and the scholars administer. The picture that Xunzi gives is of a fairly rigidly divided society, but we could set that aside and simply recognise that norms of behaviour beyond mere prudential self-interest are required in order to make the best use of the various skills of the people

b.     The Regulation of Feelings

Another reason that Xunzi gives for the introduction of ritual is so that our natural emotions may be expressible harmlessly, or even beneficially. Xunzi recognises that humans have emotions that they will desire to express, but that the unrestrained or undisciplined expression may lead to great harms. In the case of sadness upon the death of a loved one, the expression of emotion and respect are regulated by the funeral rites, and Xunzi gives a long (very long) explanation of the merits of the rites being just so and the reasons for the differentiation in rites between different layers of society.[4] In the case of various joyous emotions, he explains how the need to express those emotions may be satisfied in various appropriate forms of music.[5] (In this he disagrees with the Mohists, who thought that music was pointless and wasteful.)

In every case ritual begins in that which must be released, reaches full development in giving it proper form, and finishes in providing it satisfaction. And so when ritual is at its most perfect, the requirements of inner dispositions and proper form are both completely fulfilled.[6]

By channeling these emotional expressions through ritual and music one beautifies life as well as imposing upon it good order.

2.     Its Method

If the nature of humans is bad, and yet we wish them to be good (and they wish themselves to be good,) then it follows that their nature must be tamed. This is what ritual does. Xunzi saw the achievement of goodness in a person as a product of the deliberate cultivation of correct behaviours and attitudes; morality was definitely to be attributed to the nurture side of the nature/nurture divide, a product of culture and cultivation.

In every case, the nature of a thing is the accomplishment of Heaven. It cannot be learned. It cannot be worked at. Ritual and yi are what the sage produces. They are things that people become capable of through learning, things that are achieved through working at them.[7]

The attitude is to be contrasted with that of Mencius, for whom ritual was a more or less direct outgrowth from those seeds of goodness he identified in human nature. For Xunzi, on the other hand, ritual was a curb on our natural tendencies.

Crooked wood must await steaming and straightening on the shaping frame, and only then does it become straight. Blunt metal must await honing and grinding, and only then does it become sharp.

Repeated performance and practice and study of the rituals will have the effect of altering one’s nature so that the behaviour mandated by the rituals will become natural to one. In this respect the appropriate comparison is to Aristotle who developed a virtue ethics in which the virtues are dispositions to behave in the appropriate way, and those dispositions are the target of training that attempts to make the appropriate behaviours matters of habit. For example, when one is given reason to believe that a certain degree of willingness to face up to danger is required in order to have the virtue of courage, and one believes that one is lacking in that disposition, then one determines to behave as if one had the appropriate virtue and continue to so act until the behaviour becomes customary to one or a habit, and then becomes a natural disposition; at which time one can say that one has the virtue.[8]

3.     Its Origin

Xunzi does not think that the benefits of ritual are simply those of conventionalised behaviour. These benefits will only follow if the conventions (rituals) are appropriate to their function and respect the nature of humans. No doubt these are difficult to discover, but we are lucky in that the ancient sages provided a number of signposts (biao ?) to the proper Way. [9]

Those who cross waters mark out the deep places, but if the markers are not clear, people will fall in. Those who order the people mark out the Way, but if the markers are not clear, there will be chaos. The rituals are those markers.

Given, however, that the sages were as human as ourselves, the obvious question is how the sages managed to arrive at their knowledge of the Way. Xunzi says that there is no mystery: they discovered proper behaviour in the same way that men discovered the other arts of civilised life – through effort and intelligence.[10]

In every case ritual and yi are produced from the deliberate effort of the sage; they are not produced from people’s nature. Thus when the potter mixes up clay and makes vessels, the vessels are produced from the deliberate efforts of the craftsmen; they are not produced from human nature.

…

Sages accumulated[11] reflections and thoughts and practiced deliberate efforts and reasoned activities in order to produce ritual and yi and in order to establish proper models and measures.

But in that case, why do we need to follow the Way of the sages? Is it not possible for us to also apply our intelligence to discover the Way?

                I say, they can do it, but they cannot be made to do it

However

One’s feet can walk everywhere under Heaven. Even so, there has not yet been anyone who who has been able to walk everywhere under Heaven. It has never been that craftsmen, carpenters, farmers, and merchants cannot do each other’s business, however, none have ever been able to do each other’s business. Looking at it in this way, then one is not always able to do what one can do.

The problem is, essentially, that people don’t have the time to invent all the arts of civilisation from scratch – and civilisation could not flourish if they were required to do so. We all stand on the shoulders of giants.

---

[1] Xz c. 17 (‘Discourse on Heaven’)

[2] Xz, 19 (‘Discourse on Ritual’)

[3] The others being ‘diffidence’ (mistrust) and ‘glory’ (power-seeking) as described in Leviathan, xiii.3-9

[4] Xz, c. 19

[5] XZ, c. 20 (Discourse on Music’)

[6] Xz, c. 19

[7] Xz, c. 23 (‘Human Nature is Bad’)

[8] Nicomachean Ethics

[9] Xz, 17

[10] Xz, 23

[11] I have given the alternative translation of this passage to that in Potter’s main text.

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Les évènements en Canaan

September 4, 2019 – 8:23 pm

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L’identité des peuples de la mer

August 21, 2019 – 5:18 pm

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L’effondrement de l’âge du bronze : les peuples de la mer en Égypte

August 14, 2019 – 8:53 pm

La seule région d’où nous avons des comptes rendus du déroulement des faits de cet effondrement, c’est l’Égypte. Sous le règne du roi Mérenptah (1213-1203) de la XIXe dynastie et encore une fois sous le règne de Ramsès III (1186-1155) de la XXe dynastie l’Égypte avait subi des attaques d’ennemies qui l’avaient envahi par voie de terre et de mer. Dans sa cinquième année Mérenptah avait été attaqué par le roi libyen, Meryre, dont l’armée incluait beaucoup de guerriers étrangers des pays du nord. Ceux-ci sont nommés dans les inscriptions : les Aqwesh, les Lukkas, les Shardanes, les Shekelesh, et les Turesh. Ils faisaient tous partie des ‘peuples de la mer’ qui sont apparus en tant que collectivité a cette époque. L’attaque avait été repoussée avec grand massacre ; le roi libyen avait été mis en fuite, et ensuite il avait été tué par ses propres sujets à cause de ses échecs. Les raids ont été répété sous Ramsès. Il avait été attaqué par les libyens la cinquième et l’onzième année de son règne, et entre les deux la huitième année il y avait une fois de plus une incursion par les peuples de la mer, mené par les Peleset et les Tjeker, mais y comprenant aussi les Shekelesh, les Denyen, les Weshesh, et (peut-etre) les Turesh.

Ces invasions étaient le défi le plus grave devant lequel l’Égypte avait fait face. . Par comparaison, les insurrections qui avaient eu lieu à peu près en même temps dans les territoires du nord n’étaient que des simples agacements ou au maximum des humiliations. Pourtant, les rois de la XXe dynastie avaient révélés leur faiblesse à résister à ces harcèlements. Beaucoup de villes du Levant se sont révoltées et toute la région était troublée par les incursions de certains des mêmes peuples qui avaient troublé aussi les Egyptiens. Vers le milieu du 12e siècle, les Égyptiens semblaient avoir été repoussé de la région – ou de l’avoir abandonné.

 

Ramsès III face aux peuples de la mer, d’après le bas-relief de Médinet Habou

 Les témoignages des inscriptions

1. Le commencement de la grande inscription commémorative de Mérenptah sur l’un des murs de la grande cour des fêtes du temple d’Amon-Ra de Karnak

[Le début de la victoire que le Roi de la Haute et Basse-Égypte, Baenre-Meryamun, fils de Ré, Hotep-hima Mérenptah, donné la vie, a réalisé contre le vile chef de Libye, Meryre, le fils de De]dy, les Aqwesh, les Turesh, les Lukkas, les Shardanes, les Shekelesh, les gens du nord qui sont venus de tous les pays.

2. Extrait de la stèle de Mérenptah, appelée aussi stèle de la Victoireou encore stèle d’Israël, érigé a l’origine dans le temple funéraire du pharaon Mérenptah (dans la région thébaine)

L’an 5, troisième mois d’été, sous la majesté de Mérenptah

…

Qui a détruit le pays des Tjehmeh dans le cours de sa vie,

Lancé terreur constant dans le cœur des Meshwesh.

Il a rejeté les libyens qui ont marché sur l’Égypte,

Que l’effroi d’Égypte est grand dans leurs cœurs.

…

Leurs troupes de la première ligne étaient laissées derrière,

Leurs jambes n’ont pas pris position sauf pour s’enfuir,

Leurs archers ont abandonné leurs arcs,

Les cœurs de leurs coureurs étaient fatigués alors qu’ils se sont dépêchés,

Ils ont desserré leurs gourdes de peau, les ont jetées,

Leurs sacs à dos étaient défaits, étaient jetés,

Le chef vile, l’adversaire libyen,

S’est enfuit tout seul pendant la nuit profonde ,

Pas de plume sur sa tête, aux pieds nus,

Ses femmes étaient éloignées de sa présence,

Ses réserves de nourriture étaient saisies,

Il n’avait pas d’eau potable pour le soutenir,

Le regard de ses frères étaient féroce à le tuer,

Ses officiers se sont battus entre eux

Leurs tentes étaient brulées, réduites en cendres,

Tous ses biens étaient nourriture pour ses troupes.

Lorsqu’il est rentré dans son pays il portait le deuil,

Ceux qui restaient dans son pays n’étaient pas disposés à l’accueillir

« Un chef, malheureux, mal plumé »

Tous ont dit de lui, ceux de sa ville,

« Il est sous le pouvoir des dieux,

Les seigneurs de Memphis, le seigneur d’Égypte a rendu son nom maudit ;

Meryre est l’abomination de Memphis,

Ainsi sont aussi fils après fils de sa famille pour toujours,

Baenre-Meryamun sera après ses enfants,

Mérenptah, content avec Maat, est lui donné comme destin.

Il est devenu comme un proverbe en Libye,

Génération dit à génération de ses victoires :

Il n’était jamais fait pour nous depuis le temps de Ra ; »

Ainsi dit chaque vieux en parlant à son fils.

…

Les princes sont prosternés, disant « Shalom ! »

Aucun des Neuf Arcs ne lève pas sa tête :

Tjehenu est vaincu, Hatti en paix,

Canaan est captif avec tous les malheurs.

Ashkelon est conquise, Gaza saisie,

Yanoam est rendue inexistante,

Israël est dévasté, sans postérité,

Khor est devenue une veuve pour Égypte.

Tous d’eux qui erraient sont assujettis.

Par le Roi de Haute et Basse-Égypte, Baenre-Meryamun,

fils de Ré, Mérenptah, Content avec Maat,

donné la vie comme Ré tous les jours.

3. L’inscription de Ramses III à Medinet Habu

L’année 8 sous la majesté de (Ramses III) … Les pays étrangers ont fomenté une conspiration dans leurs îles. Tout d’un coup les terres étaient enlevées et mises en fuite dans la mêlée. Aucun territoire ne pouvait se tenir debout face à leurs armes, de Hatti, Qode, Carchemish, Arzawa, Alashiya, et autres, étant isolé a un moment donné. Un camp était installé à un endroit en Amor. Ils ont dévastés leur peuple, et la terre était comme si elle n’avait jamais existé. Ils avançaient vers l’Égypte, pendant que la flamme était préparée devant eux. Leur confédération était les pays du Peleset, du Tjekker, du Shekelesh, du Denyen, et du Weshesh réunis. Ils accaparaient les territoires jusqu’à la limite de la terre, leurs cœurs assurés et confiants: « Nos plans vont réussir! »

Alors, le cœur de ce dieu, le Seigneur des Dieux, était préparé et prêt à les attraper comme des oiseaux. … J’ai organisé ma frontière à Dhabi, préparé avant eux: – des princes, des commandants des garnisons, et maryanu. Les embouchures des fleuves j’ai préparé comme une muraille forte, avec navires de guerre, galères, et caboteurs, très bien équipés, parce qu’ils étaient équipés d’un bout à l’autre de guerriers vaillants portants leurs armes. Les escadrons étaient composés de tous les hommes d’élite d’Égypte. Ils étaient comme des lions qui rugissent aux sommets des montagnes. Les auriges étaient composés de coureurs, d’hommes d’élite, de tous les auriges bons et compétents. Les chevaux frémissaient de tous leurs corps, ils étaient prêt à écraser les pays étrangers dessous leurs sabots. J’étais le vaillant Montu (le Dieu de la guerre) me tenant ferme à leur tête, afin qu’ils puissent voir mes mains en les attrapant.

Ceux qui ont gagnés ma frontière, leur progéniture n’est pas, leur cœur et leur âme sont arrivées à leur fin pour des siècles des siècles. Ceux qui sont arrivés ensembles sur la mer, la flamme entière était devant eux aux bouches des rivières, tandis qu’une palissade de lances les entourait au rivage. Ils étaient entraînés, entourés, et prostrés au rivage; tués, et mis en tas de la tête aux pieds. Leurs vaisseaux et leurs biens étaient comme tombés dans l’eau.

J’ai fait que les terres renoncent même à mentionner l’Égypte; parce que lorsqu’ils prononcent mon nom dans leurs pays ils sont brûlés entièrement. Depuis que je me suis assis sur le trône de Har-akhti et le Grand-de-Magi < l’uræus, le symbole de royauté > était fixé sur ma tête comme Rê, je n’ai pas permis aux pays étrangers de regarder la frontière de l’Égypte, à se vanter aux Neuf-Arcs. Je leur ai pris leurs pays, leurs frontières étants ajoutées aux miennes. Leurs princes et leurs membres de la tribu sont à moi avec fierté, car je suis sûr la voie des plans du Tout-seigneur, mon père auguste et divin, le seigneur de tous les dieux.

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L’effondrement de l’âge du bronze : le problème

August 8, 2019 – 11:21 am

Vers l’an 1200 av. J.-C. les terres autour de l’est de la mer Méditerranée avaient été depuis longtemps civilisées et faisaient parties d’un système, apparemment stable, des états civilisés. Au sud, l’Égypte florissait sous les dynasties Ramessides du Nouvel Empire; à l’est, les Kassites régnaient à Babylone, le royaume médio-assyrien était à son apogée, et les Elamites prospéraient sous les Šutrukides; au nord, la civilisation mycénienne dominait la région qui entoure la mer égéenne, et l’empire Hittite régnait sur la plupart de l’Anatolie et la partie du Levant que les égyptiens ne possédaient pas. Entre et à l’intérieure de ces grandes entités politiques se trouvaient des petites cités et royaumes, subordonnés aux unes et aux autres mais dans l’ensemble prospères et pour la plupart heureux. Ainsi étaient les cités amorrites de la Syrie du nord, les cités cananéennes, l’état Alašiya à Chypre, et les états louvites de l’ouest de l’Anatolie. Ces états et cultures utilisaient l’écriture, se concentraient en des cités, et étaient presque tous en contact constant les uns avec les autres par le commerce et les relations diplomatiques. En bref, c’était une ère de paix générale tandis qu’elle voyait une concurrence normale entre les états et souffrait même des guerres épisodiques.

De cinquante à cent années plus tard la situation avait beaucoup changée. La civilisation mycénienne était révolue, ses palais détruits, et un âge sombre avait commencé pour les terres grecques qui allait durer à peu près 400 ans. L’empire Hittite, ayant subi des envahissements et des troubles intérieures, était tombé, et Hattušas, sa capitale, avait été brulée. En Babylonie, la dynastie des Kassites avait été conquise et soumise par les assyriens et enfin exterminée par un envahissement des élamites. En fait, en l’espace d’une période bien courte presque toutes les grandes villes de la Méditerranée entre Pylos et Gaza avaient été détruites. Le royaume d’Ougarit avait disparu. Il y avait de l’agitation au nord de la Syrie et au Levant, incluant notamment un envahissement par quelques tribus barbares et pillardes qu’on appelait les ‘Peuples de la Mer’. L’Egypte a survécu à ce temps des troubles mais fut beaucoup affaibli par ses guerres civiles et par deux envahissements des peuples de la mer. L’Assyrie, parmi toutes ces grandes puissances, était la seule qui était sortie de cette époque sans dommage ou même renforcée, et elle avait saisi l’opportunité d’attaquer et d’écraser les élamites. Le commerce et les affaires étaient sérieusement perturbé, des populations étaient déplacées, et presque partout l’habitude ou la capacité de l’écriture avait disparue.

Alors que ce n’est pas du tout hors du commun qu’une cité, un état, ou une culture entr’autres devient décadent, ou décline, ou s’effondre, c’est quand même bien hors du commun que cela se passent tout en même temps. C’est important donc que nous connaissions les causes d’une catastrophe tellement répandue et complète, mais elles se sont révélées difficile à découvrir. Des savants ont proposés pas mal de théories : des désastres naturelles comme la sècheresse, le tremblement de terre, ou l’éruption d’un volcan avaient mis à l’épreuve les sociétés ; l’introduction du fer avait semé la perturbation dans l’économie, qui était fondée sur le bronze ; l’introduction d’une nouvelle technique militaire, avait rendu désuète l’armée de chars, et avait donné l’avantage aux autres armées ; des grands mouvements de population, pareil aux mouvements qui avaient eu lieu à la fin de l’Empire romain, avaient semé le désordre partout ; une hausse dans la fréquence des raids de pirate, telle que l’Europe avaient souffert des vikings, avait interrompu le commerce et affaibli les états ; un effondrement général du système avait eu lieu, qui n’avait aucune raison particulière, mais qui s’ensuivait de la faiblesse générale des sociétés anciennes qui manquaient de ressort et dans lesquelles un échec dans l’une pouvait propager dans toutes les autres. Il y a deux choses à remarquer à propos de ces théories : d’abord, ces théories ne s’excluent pas l’un l’autre, et c’est bien probable qu’elles font toutes parties d’une théorie plus complexe ; et en second lieu, il resterait encore à découvrir les causes de ces causes.

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Why Do Angels Have Wings?

July 19, 2019 – 12:23 pm

‘Angel’ translates the word mal’akh in Hebrew, which is a particular kind of messenger. The Hebrew word can refer to either spiritual beings or material, but our translations only use ‘angel’ for the spiritual kind. In the Bible they are never said to have wings but are described as being like people. In Mk 16, for example, the angel is said to be ‘a young man, dressed in a white robe.’ Wings are given to cherubim (in Ezekiel’s Merkabah vision, Ez 10:6-9) and to seraphim (Isa 6:2,), and though we tend to think of all the ranks of the Celestial Hierarchy as being populated by ‘angels,’ they are never described as malakhim.

The first images of angels didn’t have wings. The earliest we know of is in a scene of the Annunciation in the Catacomb of Priscilla on the Via Salaria in Rome.

Images of angels in Christian art didn’t commonly feature wings until about the 5^th century, when it became almost universal. The first such image is on the ‘Prince’s Sarcophagus’ found near Istanbul and dating to about the end of the 4^th century.

Why they got wings at all is a bit mysterious. There may have been some confusion with the other celestial beings or it may just be a matter of adopting some elements of the preceding pagan art in which several gods and goddesses were typically shown with wings (like ‘Winged Victory.’) If it is just that, then the specific model for the angels is probably the Roman genius, a spirit that is supposed to be the guardian of a particular person. They were often depicted with wings. Here’s one from the 2^nd century in a column relief depicting the apotheosis of Antoninus Pius:

In many places in the Bible, it is implied that angels are assigned, like genii, as guardian spirits to particular persons (Catholic Encyclopaedia, s.v. ‘Angels’.) The angels on the ‘Prince’s Sarcophagus’ are also looking after the body of a royal person who is being translated to heaven, so perhaps that common theme also helped connect the two types of spirit early on.

The standard post facto justification for their depiction with wings is from John Chrysostom:

They manifest a nature’s sublimity. That is why Gabriel is represented with wings. Not that angels have wings, but that you may know that they leave the heights and the most elevated dwelling to approach human nature. Accordingly, the wings attributed to these powers have no other meaning than to indicate the sublimity of their nature.

This would be more convincing if I could find this passage anywhere in the collected works of that Saint, but a search of The Life and Works of St. John Chrysostom (Schaff, 1886) yields nothing. It is always rather suspicious when the same quote appears everywhere you look but never with a proper reference.

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