Steve Watson

Unspeakable God

February 26, 2026 – 11:00 pm

Hilary Putnam claimed as a consequence of the causal-descriptive semantic theory, that if you were a brain in a vat then you could never think that you were a brain in a vat, let alone say it, because the terms would fail to be properly causally connected to the things they were supposed to reference. (The brain in a vat would not have thoughts of vats created by the right sorts of sensory connections to real vats – only to mad-scientist-illusions of vats.) Similarly, if God exists outside of and independent of the causally structured universe – which He created – then we could not conceive of or even speak of Him.

There might be a couple of ways around this. Firstly, His incarnation as Christ might be a way for us to speak of a part of God – though not all of Him, naturally – since that part of Him does actually exist in the right causal relationships to us; though that brings up a further problem about how the ‘identity’ of the three parts can account for our different possibilities of reference. Secondly, God might have the same status as such fictional creatures as unicorns or dragons, in which the reference to non-causally-active entities (non-existent, in their cases) is constructed from other successfully referring terms. I have no idea how that could be achieved; and even if it was, would believers in God be satisfied with this status for God (or for their beliefs?)

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Zombie Iconography in a Portrait of St Catherine

February 21, 2026 – 12:00 am

A post on the Althouse blog discussing the Vogue cover of ‘Dr’ Jill Biden compared it to the figure of Catherine in a painting by Raphael.

She commented that

Catherine’s hands do not hang limply at her sides. They are expressive of ecstasy and placed in locations that would seem truly odd on a modern-day politico. Unlike Jill, she’s got her weight shifted to one side, and also unlike Jill, she’s leaning on what we know to be the device used to torture-murder-martyr her. 

The hands of Raphael’s Catherine seem oddly positioned because they’re misplaced. Catherine is in the pose for nude females known as venus pudica, and her hands are supposed to be covering her modesty – in this variant both the breasts and the pudendum. Raphael has modified the lower hand so that it is holding her clothing, but the upper hand is doing nothing useful.

Statues in this pose and with a pronounced twist to the body (contrapposto) often have some kind of an elaboration which can be used to give the statue extra support. (Even drapery would work in marble.) I notice that in the painting she’s leaning on her wheel, and I would guess that Raphael just thought that some such elaboration was a necessary part of the figure.

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Information Flow

February 18, 2026 – 9:18 pm

There is a fundamental sociological interest in the infrastructure or social conditions that facilitate the distribution of information in a society. Unfortunately, treatments of the ‘Flow of Information’ in the context of sociological or organizational theory typically refer to the ‘information channels’ that play that role with minimal if any definition or consideration of the criteria that need to be met in order for anything to play that role, while treatments in the context of Network Theory or in the domain of Logic, Language, and Computation offer only definitions that are irrelevant to the sociological context.

Begin with the necessary relevant agent interactions with information.

1. Insertion

For some proposition p, agent x∈X, a_x ∈ α_x considered as a state transformation such that a_x(σ₁) = σ₂ is an Insertion of p into σ₁ iff

1. (∃y∈X)[ (∃{x_i:i = 0, …, n}⊂ X) (∃<a_xi ∈α_xi: i = 0, …, n>) [ a_xi(σ_1+i) = σ_2+i & a_x0 = a_x ] &
   p ∈ Iv_y,σ(2+n) \Iv_y,σ1 ]
2. B_x [ ‘i.’ ] ∈ q_x
3. D_x [ ‘i.’ ] ∈ q_x

» An insertion is the deliberate addition to a state of affairs of an item of information that can be made available to some agent by some sequence of state-transforming actions by other agents.

• Write Ins(a_x, p, σ₁).
• We can also say that x Inserts p into σ₁ by a_x and write In(x, p, σ₁, a_x)
• The restriction to available information is justified by the fact that information that is not available to any agent is sociologically inert.
• The agent making the insertion must be supposed to be intending (desiring and believing) that the information will be sociologically active or else there is no sociological import to the insertion.
• Note that in the case that n = 0, condition (i) is equivalent to
  • (∃y∈X) GenIv(a_x, σ₁, p, y) or
  • (∃y∈X)[ p ∈ genIv(a_x, σ₁, y) ]
• Refinements to this definition are possible to account for situations in which condition (i) fails, or in which conditions (ii) and (iii) are not required to hold at the time of the action. For example, to take an extreme case, the Voyager spacecraft plaques would not qualify under this definition. Whether these possibilities should be considered need not delay us here.

Define an Information Insertion Point as a state of affairs, σ₁ such that

1. (∃p∈ℙ) (∃x∈X) (∃a_x∈α_x) [ a_x(σ₁) = σ₂ &
2. (∃y∈X)[ (∃{x_i:i = 0, …, n} ⊂ X) (∃<a_xi ∈a_xi: i = 0, …, n>) [ a_xi(σ_1+i) = σ_2+i & a_x0 = a_x ] &
   p ∈ Iv_y,σ(2+n) \Iv_y,σ1 ] &
3. B_x [ ‘ii.’ ] ∈ q_x ]

» An information insertion point is a state of affairs to which some agent correctly believes he may add an item of information that can be made available to some agent by some sequence of state-transforming actions by other agents.

• Write IIP(s₁)

We shall also define the Information Insertion Point for p or P as an insertion point defined for a particular proposition p or class of propositions P as a state of affairs, σ₁ such that

1. (∀p∈ℙ) (∃x∈X) (∃a_x∈α_x) [ a_x(σ₁) = σ₂ &
2. (∃y∈X)[ (∃{x_i:i = 0, …, n} ⊂ X) (∃<a_xi ∈a_xi: i = 0, …, n>) [ a_xi(σ_1+i) = σ_2+i & a_x0 = a_x ] &
   p ∈ Iv_y,σ(2+n) \Iv_y,σ1 ] &
3. B_x [ ‘ii.’ ] ∈ q_x ]

» An information insertion point for p/P is a state of affairs such that for every proposition of a certain kind some agent correctly believes he may insert that proposition as an item of information that can be made available to some agent by some sequence of state-transforming actions by other agents.

• Without danger of ambiguity, we may write IIP(σ₁, p) when referring to the case for single propositions or IIP(σ₁, P) for the case of classes of propositions, and say that σ₁ is an information insertion point for p or P.

2. Extraction

For some proposition p, agent x∈X, state of affairs σ, a_x ∈ α_x is an Extraction of p from σ iff

(∃ω)(∃h)[ Mot(ω, x, h, σ, a_x) &

» Some question ω motivates x to apply some supposed adduction h on σ using a_x

Add(a_x, h, σ) & h(σ) = p) ]

» which actually is an adducement applying the adduction h to σ, yielding p.

• Write Ext(a_x, p, σ) and say that a_x is an extraction of p from σ.
• We can also say that x Extracts p from σ by a_x and write Ex(x, p, σ, a_x)
• The agent making the extraction must be supposed to be intending (desiring and believing) the action to adduce information, otherwise the retrieval of information is merely an accidental effect of the action and cannot be part of a sociologically significant process.

Define an Information Extraction Point as a state of affairs, σ such that

(∃p∈ℙ) (∃x∈X) (∃a_x∈a_x) [ (∃ω)(∃h)[ Mot(ω, x, h, σ, a_x) & Add(a_x, h, σ)
⇒ h(σ) = p]

» An information extraction point is a state of affairs from which some agent correctly believes he may extract an item of information that he is motivated to discover that is available to some agent.

• Write IEP(σ)

We shall also define the Information Extraction Point for p or P as an insertion point defined for a particular proposition p or class of propositions P as a state of affairs, σ such that

(∀p∈ℙ) (∃x∈X) (∃a_x∈a_x) [ (∃ω)(∃h)[ Mot(ω, x, h, σ, a_x) & Add(a_x, h, σ)
⇒ h(σ) = p]

» An information extraction point for p/P is a state of affairs such that for every proposition of a certain kind some agent correctly believes he may extract that proposition as an item of information that he is motivated to discover that is available to some agent.

• Without danger of ambiguity, we may write IEP(σ, p) when referring to the case for single propositions or IEP(σ, P) for the case of classes of propositions, and say that σ is an information extraction point for p or P.

3. Transmission

Let p be a proposition, σ₁ a state of affairs, such that IIP(σ₁, p)

σ = (σ₁, …, σ_n+2) is an Information Arc for p if

(∃<τ_i: i = 0, …, n >)[ τ_i(σ_1+i) = σ_2+i &
(∃x∈X) (∃a_x∈α_x)[ In(x, p, σ₁, a_x) & τ₀ = a_x &
~IEP(σ₁, p) &
IEP(σ_2+n, p) &
(~Ins(a_x, p, σ₁) ⇒ ~IEP(σ_2+n, p)) ]]

» An information arc for a proposition is a sequence of states of affairs produced by state transformations of an information insertion point at which that proposition has been inserted that ends in an information extraction point for it.

• Write IA(σ, p)
• Note that n = 0 is possible, in which case we can talk of a Null Information Arc for p.

Define an Information Channel as a state of affairs χ, such that

(∃P⊂ℙ) (∀p∈P) (∃σ) [ IA(σ, p) &
(∀σ_i∈σ) [χ ⊂ σ_i & (~(χ ⊂ σ_i) ⇒ ~IIP(σ_i, p) & ~IEP(σ_i, p)) ]]

» An information channel is a stable state of affairs that facilitates information arcs for a class of propositions as items of information.

• Write IC(χ)
• We can call P⊂ℙ that appears in the definition above the Matter of χ, and write that M(χ)=P

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Information

February 13, 2026 – 4:13 pm

An important aspect of communication relates to the transfer of information, but the treatment of information as a sociological phenomenon cannot be limited to its associations with communication alone: of equal importance are questions of creation, access, accumulation, transformation, function, social effect, etc. To address such issues, we will need to begin with an appropriate understanding of what ‘information’ means in the sociological context. Unfortunately, ‘information’ in that context (or in most others for that matter) is a term that is more widely used than analysed; and we do not get much relevant enlightenment from the few fields of study where it has been treated rigorously such as Computer Science and Communication Studies. The definitions and investigations of information and its characteristics appropriate to those fields are those inspired by the work of Shannon and Weaver ((1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press) and are concerned with quantitative aspects of ‘information’ such as the amount of uncertainty in a variable or the ability to reconstruct messages sent over noisy channels rather than anything relevant to the questions mentioned above.

The (non-quantitative) understanding of information that is intuitively appealed to in most other fields is rather that identified by Dretske (1981/1999, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, CSLI:LSJU) as the nuclear sense of the term. There (p 44) he argues that “Roughly speaking, information is that commodity capable of yielding knowledge, and what information a signal carries is what we can learn from it” and (p. 45) “A state of affairs contains information about X to just that extent to which a suitably placed observer could learn something about X by consulting it.” As Dretske acknowledges, information is supposed to yield true beliefs, and so we can loosely say that information has to be true: although we may speak colloquially of ‘false’ information or of ‘misinformation,’ the nuclear sense rejects that possibility. On this view then, a state of affairs could be said to contain information when a true proposition which is apt for belief could be derived from that state of affairs.

This, though better, is still not an appropriate approach to information as a sociological phenomenon. The truth of a claim that is current in society is of no particular interest to the sociologist, and the effect that that claim has on society is only indirectly (and often very weakly) related to its truth or falsity. The sociologically important characteristic of such a claim – which is apt for belief on the part of some agent(s) – is the degree to which and the manner in which it affects the actions of those in the society associated with that claim in the relevant way. The relationship between this and the nuclear view of information is that the effect of the claim can be related to the belief on the part of the relevant agents that the claim is a true (or false) one and therefore a good (or bad) guide to actions, where good and bad can be understood as meaning likely to lead to good or bad results for the relevant agents. That something like this is involved in the non-specialist use of the term ‘information’ is suggested by, for example, the use of the term ‘information society’ when the subject of discussion ranges over all forms of production, consumption, and exchange of claims regardless of their relationship to truth. (Further considerations on the characteristics that should be considered in the formulation of a definition of ‘information’ for sociological purposes may be found in H. Garfinkel (ed. A. Rawls) (2008) Toward a Sociological Theory of Information, Boulder CO: Paradigm, pp.110 ff.)

Adduction and Information

The nature of the processes by which information in this relevant general sense is derived from a state of affairs is both uncertain and to a certain degree beyond the scope of our interest. The discussion will therefore be conducted at a level of abstraction that does not prejudge that nature. It will be assumed that the only relevant criteria here are that the processes are systematic and that they are dependent upon the contents of the state of affairs in question

1. Propositional Function: Adduction

A possible way that the world is may be represented as a set of propositions describing the world,

Define σ, a State of Affairs, as:

σ = {σ_i: i ∈ ℕ, s_i ∈ ℙ, σ_i is a partial description of the way the world is} where

1. σ is a consistent set

• A state of affairs is a subset of a complete description of the world.
• Σ = ∪{σ: σ is a state of affairs} is the Possible States of Affairs

Let h be a function such that

h:Σ → ℙ

h is an Adduction from a state of affairs σ iff

(∀p ∈ ℙ) [h(σ) = p ⇒ (∃S⊂σ) [h(σ\S) ≠ p]]

» An adduction is the production of a proposition apt for belief from a description of a state of affairs s. It is sensitive to the contents of s. This is a non-triviality condition.

• Write H(h, σ)
• In this case p is an Adduct of σ by h, and we say p is Adduced from σ by h.
• Not every adduction will be well-defined for every state of affairs.
• An adduction is not guaranteed to yield a true proposition, nor is it even guaranteed to yield a result that is consistent with σ.
• The set of possible adductions is barely constrained by the condition given, and we can be sure that the set of adductions that the agents of a population are actually capable of performing is a much more limited set. The discovery of which possible adductions are actually applied by agents is a matter for empirical (psychological) enquiry and will form part of the agent theory.
• The work of Sperber and Wilson (e.g. (1986) Relevance) would suggest that the actually applied adductions will turn out to be more context sensitive or otherwise complex than a mere propositional function. Nevertheless, for the simplicity of this initial development we shall maintain that assumption.

Above, h is defined as a function on the propositions of σ. However, it need not be supposed implausibly that only the complete set of propositions in σ should be necessary and sufficient for any particular h. We suppose instead that there will be a subset σ_h (proper or otherwise) for which:

1. h(σ_h) = h(σ)

» The propositions of σ_h are collectively sufficient for the adduction to yield the same result.

1. (∀s∈σ_h) [h(σ_h\s) ≠ h(σ)], or

» The propositions of σ_h are collectively necessary for the adduction to yield the same result.

• Call σ_h so characterized, the Adduction-Relevant State of Affairs for h on σ.
• We need not assume that σ_h is a unique such subset of σ
• Write ARSA(σ_h, σ, h)
• We will assume in what follows that where appropriate the state of affairs in question is an adduction-relevant one. Including the restriction in each definition, though strictly required, would add clutter to definitions which are already cluttered enough.

2. Action: Adducement

An agent is able to access the results of an adduction on a state of affairs, σ, when it is able to perform an action by which it applies some adduction h to that state of affairs and the result of that adduction is added to B_x. Such an action we shall call an Adducement for h from σ. Thus, when an agent x performs the adducement, η_x∈α_x, for the adduction h from σ:

Q(η_x,i, q_x,i) ⊃ B_x,i+1[ h(σ) ]

• All the normal indices are applicable in the obvious way.
• Write Add(η, h, σ) – though it may not be necessary to include s in the arguments.
• We may write η_h to acknowledge that the adducement applies the adduction h

3. Motivation: Interrogation

Agent x performs an adducement (quâ adducement) when he has a question that he needs answered (or is in a situation that is effectively identical to this) and which he knows or suspects can be answered by an application of an adduction on the facts presented in the current state of affairs.

We will adapt an approach to the semantics of questions by Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984, Studies in the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers, PhD Thesis, U. Amsterdam,) by which a question may be treated as a partition of the set of all propositions (van Rooy, R. (2003) ‘Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange’ in Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 12.4 pp. 423-451) where the members of that partition are the correct answers to that question in declarative form.

Let ω = { ω_i } ∈ 2^ℙ be a question,

((∀p)[~B_x[ p∈ω ]] &
B_x[ (∀p∈ω)[ q_x’ = q_x ∪ B_x[ p∈ω ] ⇒ ( T(C(A_x(q_x’, c_x), c_x), I_x) > T(C(A_x(q_x, c_x), c_x), I_x)))
⇒ D_x[ (∃p∈ω)B_x[ p∈ω ] ]

» If x believes that knowing an answer to the question ω will enable an improvement in that agent’s total satisfaction then x will desire to know that answer

• Under some fairly plausible assumptions for the logic of the B_x operator

B_x[ p∈ω ] ⇒ B_x[ p ]

But, given opacity in the D_x operator, it does not necessarily follow that

D_x[ (∃p∈ω)B_x[ p∈ω ] ⇒ D_x[ (∃p∈ω)B_x[ p ] ]

Let ω = { ω_i } ∈ 2^ℙ be a question, σ a state of affairs, h an adduction on σ; η∈α_x then

( D_x[ (∃p∈ω)B_x[ p∈ω ] ] ∈ q_x,i

» If x wants to know an answer to the question ω

& B_x[ (∃p)[p∈ω] ⇒ (∀p)[h(σ)=p ⇒ p∈ω] ] ∈ q_x,i

» and believes that if there is an answer to ω that it would be found by the adduction h on σ

& B_x[ Add(η, h, σ) ] ∈ q_x,I )

» and believes that the action η which x can perform is an adducement for h from σ

⇒ A_x(q_x,i, c_x,i) = η

» then x does η

• A more complete description of this condition would include reference to expected outcomes, weighted interests, alternative actions, and so on, but they can be ignored here for the sake of simplicity.
• Let the antecedent of that conditional be abbreviated as Mot(ω, x, h, σ, η) and read it as ω motivates x to apply h on σ using η.

Mot(ω, x, h, σ, η) ⇒ A_x(q_x,i, c_x,i) = η

• Again, note that this assumes success in adductions

4. Information

Define the (Total) Information contained in σ, as

It_σ = {p ∈ ℙ: (∃x)(∃ω)(∃h)[H(h,σ) &h(σ)=p & B_x [(∀p)[h(σ)=p ⇒ p∈ω]]]}

» The (total) information in a state of affairs is all the statements that are adducible from it by some adduction which some agent believes would thereby answer some question.

• Note that if no agent believes the adduced statement answers a relevant question, then that statement will not thereby count as information (even if it does answer the question.)
• We also say of any p ∈It_σ that it is information in σ.

Define the Information Relative to x contained in σ, as

Ir_x,σ = {p ∈ ℙ: (∃ω)(∃h)(∃η∈α_x) [H(h,σ) &h(σ)=p & Add(η, h, σ) &
                             B_x[(∀p)[h(σ)=p ⇒ p∈ω]]]}

» The information relative to an agent in a state of affairs is all the statements that may be adduced from it by the agent which he believes may answer some question.

• Ir_x,σ may be an inconsistent set
• The information relative to a population X in σ is given in the obvious way

Ir_X,σ = ∪_x∈XIr_x,σ

• Define the Population Informationally Related to i ⊂ It_σ as

Xr_i,σ = {x ∈ X:i ⊂ Ir_x,σ }

Define the Information Available to x contained in σ, as

Iv_x,σ = {p ∈ ℙ: (∃ω)(∃h)(∃η∈α_x) [H(h,σ) &h(σ) = p & Add(η, h, σ) &
                             B_x [(∀p)[h(σ)=p ⇒ p∈ω] & Add(η, h, σ) & η∈α_x]]}

» The information available to an agent in a state of affairs is all the statements that may be adduced from it by the agent which he believes may answer some question using adductions that he can perform.

• Iv_x,σ may be an inconsistent set
• The information available to a population X in σ is given in the obvious way

Iv_X,σ = ∪_x∈XIv_x,σ

• Define the Population Informationally Availed of i ⊂ It_σ as

Xv_i,σ = {x ∈ X:i ⊂ Iv_x,σ }

 

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Pope’s Theory of Metre in Old English

February 12, 2026 – 4:07 pm

According to Pope[1] the verses of OE poetry should be read so that one can beat time to the stresses in the same way that one can beat time to music. To emphasize this he uses musical notation to guide the reading of each syllable. He then proposes that the basic rhythmic structure of the poem is a straightforward four half-measures per verse. In A, D, and E this structure is almost explicit except that there is the possibility of anacrusis. Pope notes, however, that the anacrusis there can always be read in the time allotted to the final measure of the preceding verse.

The cases of B and C are more complex and involve the use of initial ‘rests,’ to continue the musical theme, in order to integrate the unimportant preliminary syllables into the basic rhythmic structure. The treatment differs according to the number of such syllables to be integrated. Thus:

• 1 syllable may be treated as anacrusis or as the up-beat of the first measure after a rest. (Prefixes are always to be treated as anacrusis.)
• 2 syllables may be anacrusis if the connection to the preceding verse is so close that they make a single phrase.
• Otherwise, 2 or more syllables are assigned to the first measure with an initial rest – unless they are so numerous as to fill the measure, in which case no rest is required.
• A 5^th syllable may form monosyllabic anacrusis

An example of this and of Pope’s notation is given for verse 3^a.

          hū^\ ðā æ^//þelin^\\gas
      | ♪ ♪|♪♪♪  ♪ |

Many of these rests occur at the beginning of stanzas, fits, verse paragraphs or poems. This poem, notably, should commence with a rest according to Pope’s system; thus:

          Hwæt^\, wē Gār^//-De^\\na     
      |  ♩  ³ ♪|♩ ♪  ♪|

The recognition of the presence of such rests in verses which are not preceded by other verses or which follow significant pauses requires an independent time-keeping device. Since the harp is often mentioned in the poetry itself as the proper accompaniment of the poem Pope proposes that it was the harp that performed the time-keeping function.

[1] Pope, John C. ((1942) 1966) The Rhythm of Beowulf. New Haven: Yale University Press

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How to Develop an Interstellar Information Exchange

February 11, 2026 – 10:16 pm

I read an article by Matt Williams in Universe Today on von Neumann probes and the consequences of accepting the plausibility of that concept for SETI strategies. (Why Would an Alien Civilization Send Out Von Neumann Probes? Lots of Reasons, says a new Study – Universe Today.) The article is largely in response to the paper “Von Neumann probes: rational propulsion interstellar transfer timing,” by Greg Matloff recently published in the International Journal of Astrobiology. In that paper Matloff reviews some of the reasons that an advanced species might go the route of sending out Von Neumann machines.

1. To preserve the memory of their civilisation beyond its end.
   1. And possibly to warn against the errors/dangers that have caused their demise
2. To distribute ‘lurkers’ to await the rise of intelligent life or to monitor its progress
   1. And possibly to take actions against perceived threats from those intelligences
3. To distribute life in the vast, dead universe
   1. Possibly as a type of colonisation,
4. To interfere in the development of life and intelligence

Frankly none of those reasons seem to be particularly good ones, and they’re not the reasons I had read elsewhere for sending out VNMs.

• Usually, it’s a type of exploration that can be done without the drawbacks of life support and which is self-sustaining and self-expanding. The originating intelligence only needs to wait at home and receive the ever-increasing number of reports from the increasing number of VNMs
• Isaac Asimov proposed in one of his Foundation continued novels that VNMs had been sent out to terraform likely worlds, so that when humans followed much later, they had destinations that were worth getting to. (It was ‘unfortunate’ that in the process they eliminated any indigenous life or intelligence that already existed on those worlds, which is why the galaxy in his novels is all humans only.)
• I proposed elsewhere that VNMs might be sent out to create an infrastructure for exploration and colonisation but that terraforming wasn’t involved – because I don’t think that planetary surfaces are the optimal sites for intelligences.

It occurred to me however, that there was another possibility, and that this might have a consequence for the types of machines out there and their capacities and how to find them and how to contact them. I propose that VNM machines might be sent out:

5. To form the backbone/infrastructure of a contact/communication/information distribution system. Something like a galactic encyclopaedia

Any intelligence eventually realises that interstellar travel is impossible for mortal creatures and useful interstellar two-way communication is very unlikely. In order to benefit from the presence of alternative intelligences an infrastructure would be needed by which their informational stores could be accessed asynchronously.

A device in the local intelligence’s neighbourhood, could do this if it were designed to be capable of receiving information (from the originating alternative intelligence,) storing it, and transmitting it to the local intelligence’s agents. An alien intelligence interested to do this would send out VNMs to play that role. The question is why any intelligence would be motivated to do so.

Consider that a more obvious mission for a probe is to receive information from an alien intelligence and to transmit that to the originating intelligence. Apart from information that can be gathered remotely – which must be limited in scope and value – the access to information from the stores of an alien intelligence generally requires the cooperation of that alien intelligence. Note that trying to access that information without cooperation is likely to be seen as hostile and would increase the likelihood of losing the device. The question here is why the alien intelligence would be motivated to cooperate.

The possibility of an exchange of information would provide the motivations for both parties in the scenarios above. The probe would gain access to the alien intelligence’s information stores in exchange for giving the alien intelligence access to the information stores of its originating intelligence. Presumably, there would be a series of steps in the probe / local intelligence communication to encourage parity of information exchange, fair dealing, honesty, and security for both parties. It would be an interesting problem to determine exactly what protocols could satisfy such criteria: that would tell us how we could expect a completely alien probe to behave.

Both local and alien intelligences are motivated to send out VNMs to play the role of information transceivers, but only if they have not already encountered a transceiver. If an intelligence encounters a transceiver, then that VNM is already active, and it would be merely redundant to send out their own VNM. An exception to this would be if the intelligence that encounters a VNM transceiver believes that it can improve on the device in some way. This is unlikely, since the VNM is likely to have been sent by an intelligence further advanced than the one that had not sent out a VNMTX.

The situation in which two VNMTXs encounter each other in a third system is a little less fraught than the situation in which a VNM locates a local intelligence directly. Protocols to establish a connection between the two would be another interesting problem. In the best case, they would recognise each other for what they are and would be able to fuse their networks. Repeated encounters with VNMs from different originators could thus eventually result in a widespread collaborating network of information exchangers.

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Sievers-Bliss

February 9, 2026 – 9:33 pm

As part of my effort to create a performance-oriented version of Beowulf, I had to look into the proposed theories of metre for Old English. I thought I might as well put the summaries of what I found here. 

From a study of old Germanic and Scandinavian poetic metres, Eduard Sievers[1] derived a podic system in which each verse was required to instantiate one of a limited number of patterns of stress. With later modifications by Alan Bliss,[2] this system has gained wide acceptance.

According to this system the stressed and unstressed syllables of a verse must fall into one of just 5 patterns.

Type A:  / x (x x x x) / x
Type B:   (x x x x) x / x (x) /
Type C:   (x x x x x) x / / x
Type D:  / (x x x) / \ x
Type E:   / \ x (x) /

The parentheses indicate the number of unstressed syllables which optionally occur at that position.

The verses in a line may be any combination of verse types.

Notes:

1. Anacrusis may occur in lines of type A or D, thus:

Type A⁺: (x x) | / x (x x x x) / x
Type D⁺: (x x) | / (x x x) / \ x

2. The stress pattern of a verse may occasionally be augmented by what seems to be half of another Type added to its end. Such half-lines are called hypermetric verses and often come in groups of three.

Just because this system creates such a complete typology of line forms and is almost universally used even by those who are not committed to it as a metrical theory we shall include here a description of the metrical sub-types that the system recognises. Note that for brevity the optional unstressed syllables are left out of the descriptions of each type and subtype

A             / x / x
A1           Alliteration on the 1^st lift or (for the on-verse) on both
A2          \ replaces x in either foot or both; often has double alliteration
A2a         / \ / x     \ in 1^st dip, which may be a resolved syllable
A2b         / x / \     \ in 2^nd dip, which may be a resolved syllable
A2ab       / \ / \     \ in both dips, which may be resolved syllables
A3           Alliteration only on 2^nd lift
A3b         / x / \     \ in 2^nd dip, which may be a resolved syllable     

B             x / x /
B1           2^nd dip has one syllable
B2          2^nd dip has two syllables
B3          Alliteration only on 2^nd lift

C            x / / x
C1          1^st lift is not resolved
C2         1^st lift is resolved
C3         2^nd lift is short

D            / / \ x     Double alliteration is required and so this is always an on-verse
D1          \ is in 3^rd position and long
D2          \ is in 3^rd position and short
D3          2^nd lift is short and \ is long
D4          / / x \    
D*          Called Expanded as it has an extra syllable or two after the 1^st lift
D*1        \ is in 3^rd (equivalent) position and long
D*2        \ is in 3^rd (equivalent) position and short
D*4        / / x \    

E             / \ x /     Sievers’ sub-types here are no longer generally distinguished as such

Critics attack this system for being more complex than the source material would seem to justify and also for not giving any explanation for why the verses have to go into just those 5 patterns. Moreover, it is observed that there are grammatically and semantically correct lines of OE poetry which do not fit the scheme. The typical response to this is to assume that such lines are the result of scribal errors and to seek to correct them, but this is felt by some critics to be presumptuous: a theory should be made to fit the data, not the other way around.

[1] Sievers, Eduard (1893) Altgermanische Metrik. Sammlung Kurzer Grammatiken Germanischer Dialekte, Ergänzungsreihe, 2. Halle: Niemeyer

[2] Bliss, Alan Joseph (1958) The Metre of ‘Beowulf.’ Oxford: Blackwell; (1962) Introduction to Old English Metre. Oxford: Blackwell

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The Question of the ‘Legitimacy’ of Chinese Philosophy

February 7, 2026 – 10:48 am

Western philosophers – or philosophers working in the Western tradition – whatever their interest in Chinese systems of thought may be, do not draw upon them for insights, or adopt any of their ideas and concepts to augment the standard repertoire. In particular, where Chinese Philosophy is taught, it is taught in a separate in which it is treated as different from real philosophy and more like an intellectual curiosity of history or geography.

Now, the same might be said to be true of all non-Western philosophies – of Indian or Islamic Philosophies for example. It might be said, in generalizing the statement above, that Western philosophers, whatever their interest in non-Western systems of thought, do not draw upon them for insights, or adopt any of their ideas and concepts to augment the standard repertoire. There too, where a non-Western philosophy is taught, it is taught in a separate class in which it is treated as different from real philosophy and more like an intellectual curiosity of history or geography. The situation for Chinese Philosophy is, however, rather more severe than that, for there are many who seem to believe that Chinese Philosophy, more than just being irrelevant to, incompatible with, or inferior to Western Philosophy, is not really philosophy at all. Comments may be made, for example, that it lacks the essential characteristics of a rational and dialectical domain of enquiry, that its concerns are not those of philosophers, or that it is merely, at best, a type of ‘Wisdom’ literature common enough in world cultures and not to be despised for that but not to be patronisingly over-valued either. In this way, the very legitimacy of the term ‘Chinese Philosophy’ is put in question.

Not surprisingly, this has irritated some Chinese scholars. One, for example, writes that

Western philosophical circles have for a long time refused to regard Chinese philosophy as a philosophy and have only studied it as a sort of thought or religion, precisely because they maintain that the questions of Western philosophy were not discussed in Chinese philosophy or not discussed in the Western manner. Regarding the questions of Western philosophy as the questions of “philosophy,” or understanding philosophy merely as a branch of learning concerned with exposition and justification (lun zheng zhixue), and thereupon determining whether or not a non-Western culture possesses a philosophy, is, in essence, a manifestation of Western cultural chauvinism. (Chen Lai (2005) ‘An Elementary Discussion of a Number of Questions Concerning “Chinese Philosophy”,’ Contemporary Chinese Thought, 37:1, 34-42, p. 40)

And it is also challenged by a number of Western students of the subject. As far back as 1996 BW van Norden, for example, wrote a letter to the APA (Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 70.2 (November 1996) pp 161-3) putting the case for including Chinese philosophy as part of the great conversation. His arguments there were cogent enough but with the continuing failure to adopt his recommendations he has become more inclined to simply attribute it to racism. Thus, in an interview for the ABC in 2019 he declared

“It definitely is due to racism,” he says. “When Europeans first encountered philosophy in China and India, they immediately recognised it as philosophical and were fascinated by it.” Beginning with Kant, he says, Western philosophers “started to assume that people in India and China were racially incapable of doing philosophy. “Kant’s claims about white racial superiority were accepted by generations of students, and Kant’s own disciples rewrote the philosophy textbooks.” (Racist attitudes ‘whitewashed’ modern philosophy. What can be done to change it? – ABC News)

The question cannot, however, be rejected simply in terms of anti-colonialism, white supremacy, Western chauvinism, etc. Those aren’t arguments or intellectual responses to the question: they are simply ways of saying ‘shut up.’ Yet the question remains pertinent, because it is obvious to most people that there are significant differences between the things that Chinese philosophers tend to do and say and the things that Western philosophers tend to do and say. Chinese and Western philosophies just feel different; but does this feeling signify anything more than that we are faced with an unfamiliar form of philosophy.

1. Reasons for Doubt?

Perhaps it does. Consider that until recently there was no such term as ‘philosophy’ in Chinese by which to refer to whatever it was that the Western philosophers were doing. It was necessary for a Japanese scholar (Nishi Amane) trained in the Netherlands to invent a term (tetsugaku) using the Chinese characters (??) that would be pronounced zhexue (lit. ‘wisdom study.’) This term was then applied to the pursuits of some figures in Chinese history who were then declared to be Chinese ‘philosophers.’ The term was so applied because the actions or interests of those persons were felt to be in some way similar to those of Western exemplars of the term ‘philosopher:’ I am not aware that any well-reasoned criteria were first provided for being a philosopher. The class of Chinese philosophers is therefore one that was discovered or invented after the fact and was not driven by any internal requirements of the Chinese society but, one might suspect, because Chinese self-respect demanded that they have something to set beside the Western class that was so highly regarded by the West. The members of that class were selected – whether by Westerners or by Chinese – as just the sorts of individuals whose membership looked plausible given the sorts of individuals who were allowed to be members of the Western class of ‘philosophers.’ The reason that the class of Chinese philosophers seems comparable to the class of Western philosophers is because it has been carefully constructed to do so.

a. Philosophy as a Cultural Form

This has consequences for the legitimacy of CP. Suppose that the class of Western philosophers emerges from the application of criteria (perhaps not explicitly formulated) and that amongst these criteria are certain functional (what they do) or procedural (how they do it) or relational (to whom they are reacting) restrictions on the activities of persons who thereby get to be assigned membership of the class, and suppose that philosophy as we know it is whatever the members of this class do in the appropriate way with appropriate others that entitles them to membership of this class. Then, because it is plausible that the class of Chinese philosophers is not defined by the appropriate criteria but only by a kind of surface similarity, it may equally follow that what the members of that class do does not count as philosophy.

b. Comparison to Science as a Cultural Form

Perhaps we could compare this to the question of whether there was a Chinese Science. Science, as we understand it, is a certain kind of pursuit of knowledge about the external world. The search for a pure criterial account of Science has proven chimerical, yet we can most of us recognise it when we see it and recognise its absence when we see that. One way to resolve that paradox might be to approach the question of the definition of Science from the other direction – just as was proposed for the definition of Philosophy above. It’s at least plausible that we may define the class of scientists in terms of what they do, how they do it, and with respect to whom they do it, just as we supposed could be the case for the class of philosophers. It’s at least plausible that we may then say that Science is whatever it is that scientists do when they do it in the appropriate way and while in the appropriate relations to appropriate others, just as we supposed could be the case for Philosophy.

Now suppose that we reviewed Chinese history to determine whether there was a Chinese Science. We might identify a number of individuals who did certain things, proposed certain theories, made certain discoveries, created certain inventions which looked a bit similar to the sorts of things done, theories proposed, discoveries made, inventions created by members of the class of Scientists. We might call them the Chinese scientists. Yet we would not then be justified in claiming that this demonstrated that there was a Chinese Science, because the criteria for selection of the Chinese scientists are not relevantly similar to the criteria for the class of Scientists. In fact, the choice of those criteria of selection of the Chinese scientists mistakes the ‘accidents’ of Science for its ‘essence’, and the effects of good Science for its causes.

c. Plausibility of this Comparison

In fact, it is much less controversial to claim that China did not have Science than it is to claim that China did not have Philosophy. This is probably because we recognise that Science was actually something that had to be developed: there was a time – quite recently – when there was no Science in the West. We find it much harder to imagine that Philosophy is like that: its origins are so far in our past that we imagine it to be a natural possession of all humans – but this imagining may well be incorrect. In any case it is accepted that whereas there is some overlap in the activities and achievements of Chinese individuals with the activities and achievements of Western scientists, this does not amount to there being a Chinese Science. There are Chinese technologists, craftsmen, inventors and alchemists (who may even apply trial and error to their endeavours,) speculators on the natural order, and so on, but no Chinese Science.

On the other hand, it might be argued, as Norden and Garfield do argue, that there is an essential difference between Philosophy and Science.

Non-European philosophical traditions offer distinctive solutions to problems discussed within European and American philosophy, raise or frame problems not addressed in the American and European tradition, or emphasize and discuss more deeply philosophical problems that are marginalized in Anglo-European philosophy. There are no comparable differences in how mathematics or physics are practiced in other contemporary cultures. (Garfield, J. and B. W. van Norden, ‘If Philosophy Won’t Diversify …’ The Stone, 11/5/2016)

That final claim is true, but only because all contemporary Science derives from Western Science. The preceding claims are also perhaps true but relate to those parts of philosophy that we might think of as its contingent qualities. In Science they might be compared to the Arab Alhazen’s theory of optics which preceded European Science in rejecting the extromission theory of vision. If those particular Chinese philosophical items are worthwhile, they may be adopted by Modern Philosophy without qualms.

2. Reasonable Reactions to that Doubt

Of course, the easiest response in rebuttal is simply to say that, however we might have come to accept a category of activities under the label of philosophy, we now have a pretty good idea of the sorts of activities and concerns and methods that we are prepared to countenance as philosophical, and that by most criteria that might be reasonably proposed Chinese Philosophy cannot be denied legitimacy. The acid test for this response would be an attempt to come up with some list of criteria that would at the same time include all that we accept as Philosophy and exclude all that we are sure doesn’t count as Philosophy and then to apply that to what has been proposed as Chinese Philosophy to see whether it is accepted or not.

a. The Problem of Appropriate Criteria

This, in fact, would seem to be the obvious way to approach the question of inclusion of non-Western Philosophy into the class of Philosophy, but there are some obvious difficulties. In the first place, if we compare the vast range of things that have been accepted as Philosophy in the West, we might doubt that any set of criteria could be proposed which would properly mark out the class. There may be no good set of criteria which will include the work of Parmenides, Plato, Kripke, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Carnap while excluding all the speculative, irrational, mystical, nonsensical stuff that we don’t want in the class. The diversity just seems too great to be captured by a strict criterial approach. In such a case we might be forced to fall back on the idea – popular at one time – of a term whose extension is marked by a series of family resemblances or overlapping well-defined classes none of which cover all and only the required space. ‘Philosophy,’ could be a term like ‘game’ (in Wittgenstein’s example.) In that case, to determine whether Chinese Philosophy existed we would need to determine whether elements of Chinese Philosophy showed one or other of the identified family resemblances of Western Philosophy.

b. The Problem of Parochialism

But that very process still assumes the centrality and normativity of Western Philosophy, and it may not be a great advance to say that Chinese Philosophy only exists in so far as it has a sufficient family resemblance to Western Philosophy. This is exactly the chauvinism that people like van Norden decry. A more radical alternative might be to say that in the West there is a class of intellectuals we call Philosophers who do something we call Philosophy and that is a Western thing. In China there is a different class of intellectuals who do something else. We might accept that there is some overlap in some respects between these two classes and their doings without being at all inclined to say that the one is a subclass of the other, or that the set of Chinese intellectuals or their doings in the defined intersection could reasonably be discussed independently of their larger group. It has in fact been suggested that such a class of Chinese intellectuals is the class of ‘sages’or zhuzi (??) whose function is the pursuit of sagacity, sagery, sage-ness, or sagesse. The study of Chinese philosophy should be abandoned and the study of Chinese sagesse should replace it, because that is to study the undistorted form of the Chinese thought and to respect the Chinese understanding of their own civilisation.

Conclusion

I have no particular conclusion apart from a general belief that the study of a diversity of forms of thought is always valuable in itself – and probably instrumentally too. The question of the legitimacy of Chinese Philosophy might be a merely semantic except for the (unnecessary, socially contingent) effect that it has on the tendency to encourage the serious study of Chinese forms of thought. I have spent more time here presenting a plausible case against this legitimacy mostly because students of Chinese Philosophy would otherwise not often encounter one: those who dismiss Chinese Philosophy are not much concerned to attack it any more than Physicists spend much time attacking astrology, and those who are in support of it are more concerned to argue for it than to give the arguments against it.

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Sketch of the Sufi Path

February 6, 2026 – 3:26 pm

Stage	Achievement	Occult power
0. Salik (Seeker) On the Sufi path
1. Muridi (Discipleship) Accepted by a master – a Sheik or Murshid
2. Tariqat (Potentiality) Dedicated to oneness with the spirit of the Sheik or Murshid		Sihr. (Lawful/white magic) only by permission of the Sheik or Murshid
3. Safar-ullah (Journey to Knowledge) Dedicated to oneness with the spirit of the Pir	Arif (Knowledge) Attainment of spiritual and occult powers.	Mu’awanat. (Supernatural power) e.g. flying, teleportation
4. Safar li-ullah (Journey from Neglectfulness) Dedicated to oneness with the spirit of the Prophet	Fana (Annihilation) Truth is reached.	Karamat (Wonders) e.g. walking on water, prophecy.
5. Safar-billah (Journey ) Returning to guide men on the Sufi path	Baqa (Degree of Wali/saint) In state of Masaviut tarafain (balance between two forces.)	Mujiza (Miracles)

Source: Idries Shah, Oriental Magic, p 72

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Feng Youlan’s Revisions

January 2, 2022 – 8:56 pm

Feng’s own philosophical positions were presented in a series of works beginning with the Xin Lixue (The New Study of Principles) which proposed a reform of the Lixue branch of Neoconfucianism associated with the names of the Song dynasty scholars Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. (It is for that reason also called the Cheng-Zhu School.) His reform involved the analysis of certain terms important in both Neoconfucianism and Taoism according to the methods and standards of Western philosophy. He claimed, in fact, that each of these terms named an idea that was the logical consequence of the statement that ‘something exists.’ Having derived these concepts in a rationally acceptable way he could then reconstruct the core philosophy with regard to these new understandings. We shall look at the reconstruction of just two of these terms.

Li.

You might recall that li was proposed by Cheng Yi as the cause of qi condensing into a flower in one case and leaves in another. Qi condenses into a flower ‘because’ it is ‘informed’ by the li of a flower. Zhu Xi added that the li of a flower also gives the definition, standard, or norm of that flower – how the flower ought to be – rather in the way that a mould can be taken as defining the shape of the object cast. A difficulty with all this, however, is that proposing li as an ad hoc solution to the problem of a causal gap tells you nothing about the nature of that li or whether it does exist, and arguments derived from Hume – with which Feng would have been familiar – show that we could not derive the claimed normative role from its supposed positive causal nature.

In Feng’s view, li are the ideal reality that we implicitly hypothesize or the abstractions that we implicitly create when we accept that general terms name things that exist in the real world. Because we accept that there are flowers, there must be the class of things called ‘flowers;’ there must be a characterization of that class; there must be an ideal of ‘flowers.’ In this case li is a purely formal concept and has no necessary content. The discovery of its content – if in fact there is any– is a task for empirical research. “It is the business of science to find out the content of the individual Li, using the scientific and pragmatic method.”[1] The cause of the condensation of qi into that particular instantiation of the li is equally a matter for science. Such research then takes the place of Zhu Xi’s gewu or ‘investigation of things, an important praxis of that school, whose purpose was rather to use deep contemplation on the assumed content of the li of some experienced thing to reach a sudden enlightenment concerning the content of all li.

Qi.

The daoxue generally accepted the view of Zhang Zai according to whom qi, originally just meaning ‘breath’ and signifying one of several kinds of influence, was taken to be the material force – the motive towards materiality of the universe – which produces the two subsidiary principles or tendencies of yin and yang which, in their turn, influence qi. Under the influence of yang qi has the property of Movement and constitutes Actuality: it condenses to form the things in the world. Under the influence of yin it has the property of Quiescence and constitutes Potentiality: when it dissipates things in the world go out of existence. There are many difficulties with this view too: For example, how are yin, yang, and qi causally related, is the circularity involved vicious, and what is the character of this qi beyond its mere relationship with yin and yang?

According to Feng, qi is no more than the logical consequence of the claim that a principle can be actualiised in matter. If that is the case, he argues, then there must be a potential for materialization and a material force to bring this about. Understood in this way – if this way can be understood – qi is no more contentful as a concept than li and remains an empty form waiting for empirical investigation to complete it. In particular, it implies nothing at all about whatever relationships may exist amongst itself and yin and yang which are, as with the case of li, relationships to be explored empirically.

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