Steve Watson

Feng Youlan’s Revisions

Feng’s own philosophical positions were presented in a series of works beginning with the Xin Lixue (The New Study of Principles) which proposed a reform of the Lixue branch of Neoconfucianism associated with the names of the Song dynasty scholars Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. (It is for that reason also called the Cheng-Zhu School.) His reform involved the analysis of certain terms important in both Neoconfucianism and Taoism according to the methods and standards of Western philosophy. He claimed, in fact, that each of these terms named an idea that was the logical consequence of the statement that ‘something exists.’ Having derived these concepts in a rationally acceptable way he could then reconstruct the core philosophy with regard to these new understandings. We shall look at the reconstruction of just two of these terms.

Li.

You might recall that li was proposed by Cheng Yi as the cause of qi condensing into a flower in one case and leaves in another. Qi condenses into a flower ‘because’ it is ‘informed’ by the li of a flower. Zhu Xi added that the li of a flower also gives the definition, standard, or norm of that flower – how the flower ought to be – rather in the way that a mould can be taken as defining the shape of the object cast. A difficulty with all this, however, is that proposing li as an ad hoc solution to the problem of a causal gap tells you nothing about the nature of that li or whether it does exist, and arguments derived from Hume – with which Feng would have been familiar – show that we could not derive the claimed normative role from its supposed positive causal nature.

In Feng’s view, li are the ideal reality that we implicitly hypothesize or the abstractions that we implicitly create when we accept that general terms name things that exist in the real world. Because we accept that there are flowers, there must be the class of things called ‘flowers;’ there must be a characterization of that class; there must be an ideal of ‘flowers.’ In this case li is a purely formal concept and has no necessary content. The discovery of its content – if in fact there is any– is a task for empirical research. “It is the business of science to find out the content of the individual Li, using the scientific and pragmatic method.”[1] The cause of the condensation of qi into that particular instantiation of the li is equally a matter for science. Such research then takes the place of Zhu Xi’s gewu or ‘investigation of things, an important praxis of that school, whose purpose was rather to use deep contemplation on the assumed content of the li of some experienced thing to reach a sudden enlightenment concerning the content of all li.

Qi.

The daoxue generally accepted the view of Zhang Zai according to whom qi, originally just meaning ‘breath’ and signifying one of several kinds of influence, was taken to be the material force – the motive towards materiality of the universe – which produces the two subsidiary principles or tendencies of yin and yang which, in their turn, influence qi. Under the influence of yang qi has the property of Movement and constitutes Actuality: it condenses to form the things in the world. Under the influence of yin it has the property of Quiescence and constitutes Potentiality: when it dissipates things in the world go out of existence. There are many difficulties with this view too: For example, how are yin, yang, and qi causally related, is the circularity involved vicious, and what is the character of this qi beyond its mere relationship with yin and yang?

According to Feng, qi is no more than the logical consequence of the claim that a principle can be actualiised in matter. If that is the case, he argues, then there must be a potential for materialization and a material force to bring this about. Understood in this way – if this way can be understood – qi is no more contentful as a concept than li and remains an empty form waiting for empirical investigation to complete it. In particular, it implies nothing at all about whatever relationships may exist amongst itself and yin and yang which are, as with the case of li, relationships to be explored empirically.