Week
|
Topic
Notes
|
Text
|
Further
Reading
|
|
|
Dualism
|
Ch.1, pp. 5 - 19
|
Descartes
Meditation 6;
Descartes to
Elisabeth 21/5/1643
Descartes to
Elisabeth 28/6/1643
|
|
2
|
Materialism Refined
|
Ch.1, pp. 19 - 35
|
D. Stoljar (2001) Physicalism,
SEP
|
|
3
|
Behaviourism
and Identity
|
Ch.2, pp. 37 - 46
Ch.6, pp. 95 - 104
|
G.
Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mind,
ch. 1.
U.
T. Place (1956) ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process’
|
|
4
|
Analytic
Functionalism
|
Ch.3, pp.
48 - 64
|
J.
Levin (2004) Functionalism
(SEP) §§ 3.1 - 4.2
Lewis
‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’
|
|
5
|
Reference
and Functionalism
|
Ch.4, pp.
67 - 83
Ch.5, pp.
84 - 91
|
M. Reimer (2003) 'Reference'
(SEP) §2
|
|
6
|
Problems with Functionalism
|
Ch.7, pp.
107 - 128
|
Searle
‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’;
|
|
7
|
Qualia
Problems and Functionalism
|
Ch.8, pp.
129 - 153
|
Nagel
‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’;
Jackson ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’;
'Epiphenomenal
Qualia'.
|
|
8
|
The Intentional Stance
|
Ch. 9, pp. 154-167
|
Dennett
‘Intentional Systems Theory’
|
|
9
|
The
Language of Thought
|
Ch. 10, pp. 171-184
|
Aydede
'The Language of Thought Hypothesis'
Fodor
'Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought'
|
|
10
|
The Problem of Content
|
Ch. 11, pp. 185-217
|
Neander
(2004) 'Teleological Theories of Mental Content'
Milikan
(1989) 'Biosemantics'
|
|
11
|
Broad and Narrow Content
|
Ch. 12, pp. 137-160
|
Putnam
'The Meaning of 'Meaning''
|
|
12
|
Eliminativism
|
Ch. 14, pp. 265-279
|
Stich
& Nichols ‘Folk Psychology’;
Churchland
‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’
|
