5. Empirical Functionalism

5. Empirical Functionalisms

Common-sense Functional Roles as a Reference-fixing Device

The knowledge constraint on understanding

Most people know what M state terms mean, so a theory about them should acknowledge this.

CSF-ism does so because the theory’s clauses are supposed to be common knowledge (inc. implicit.)

CSF-ism thinks of folk knowledge as giving the meaning of M state terms, but you could think that they just fix the reference – just as ‘water’ fixed the reference for watery stuff.

We understood ‘water’ before we knew it was H₂O because

a. its reference is fixed by being watery

b. we knew about being watery

c. fixing a term’s reference by things we know suffices for us to understand it.

Empirical functionalism

Empirical functionalism follows the second route for M state terms. It has two versions:

1. the clauses fix on the physical states that actually play the M state roles in us.

This would deny multiple realizability – it’s not popular.

2. the clauses fix on further roles that science must discover (a posteriori.)

We identify M states by folk functional clauses, but M states are not determined by the folk functional roles but by the internal functional roles that underpin them.

Version 2 EF-ism is sometimes stated as:

a. M states are occupants of functional roles

b. Which roles an M-state occupies is up to science to discover

But this makes it a mystery how we can identify M states at all – not knowing science’s final discoveries.

We need the folk clauses to give us identification; but we can suppose that they are just fixing the reference of the M state terms and don’t give us their meaning.

The essences of mental states

The same point stated in terms of essences: functional essences of M states are a posteriori matters, but we look to the folkf functional roles to iindicate the states of interest.

Compare: the essence of water is H₂O, discovered empirically; but we discover that by testing things that we identify as water by their being clear, colourless, etc.

Chauvinism and Empirical Functionalism

The chauvinism-liberalism dilemma

In EF-ism input and output (x-put) clauses typically describe x-puts to the central nervous system. (Because that’s where the internal functional roles underpinning the folk functional roles are likely to be found.)

If they make these x-put clauses refer to ‘distant’ objects, like the objects that people are usually aware of, then EF-ism becomes indistinguishable from CSF-ism.

If they make the x-put clauses more ‘local’ then they invite chauvinism by excluding things that are unlike us in their physical makeup.

Machine functionalism

One solution might be machine functionalsm: to give a very abstract characterization of the x-puts on the assumption that the common-sense roles fix reference only on very abstract features of ourselves.

Two notions of multiple realization

The coke machine of ch. 3 had x-puts ‘$1’, ‘50c’, ‘coke’. We could have made the table with 1, 2, 3 in their place. That even more abstract machine could have described many different less abstract machines. Not just a coke machine, but also a washing machine or a ticket seller. So we can think of two notions of multiple realizability:

1. different states or things in the same functional role

2. different roles satisfying the same much more abstractly specified role

We’ve been thinking of MR as being like 1. but perhaps it’s like 2.

Excessive liberalism

But this would mean a machine that just does a numerical simulation of our M states would satisfy the same more sbstractly specified functional roles as we did. So it would have M states.

But surely the M state pain must have a connection to body damage? The machine above doesn’t require it; so we think that the machine shouldn’t said to be in pain. It shouldn’t be said to have any M states.

So this kind of F-ism is too liberal.

Internal architecture chauvinism

EF-ists do need to accept CSF-ist style x-put clauses, and the M state terms are taken to fix reference on the processing architecture linking the x-puts.

But what if there are different architectures that yield the same results – like Mac vs. Windows word processors, or Turing machine vs. Connectionist processors. Is one that works differently from ourselves therefore not a Mind? Seems unfair.

Table 5.1 Varieties of functionalism and their characteristics

	The place of the folk roles	Inputs and outputs	Necessary constraints on internal nature	Problems
Common-sense functionalism	Give the meaning of mental state terms	Environmentally characterized	Whatever it takes to realize the folk roles so long as the states are non-fluky, not externally controlled, non-Blockhead (see ch. 7)	Specifying the folk roles; phenomenal experience (see ch.8). Qualia
Empirical functionalism I	Fix the reference of the mental state terms onto the states that fill the roles	Environmentally characterized or as inputs and outputs at the periphery of the bain	The categorical states that realize the roles	Contradicts multiple realizability in its most plausible manifestation. Qualia.
Empirical functionalism II	Fix reference to internal functional roles (on some views these role states are the mental states, on others the roles are in turn occupied by mental states.)	Peripheral states of the bain	At least enough to ensure the right peripheral connections	Input-output chauvinism. Qualia
Empirical functionalism III (machine functionalism)	Fix reference on machine table	Anything provided the machine table comes out right via highly abstract mappings	At least enough to realize machine table (perhaps alarmingly little.)	Bucket of water objection; i.ie. excessive liberalism. Qualia.
Empirical functionalism IV (cognitive science functionalism)	Fix reference on something like the internal architectures of we exemplars	Via connexion to the environment	Internal natures must be the same as that described by the most explanatory story given by an empirical science of how paradigm thinkers actually work	Internal architecture chauvinism. Qualia.
Empirical functionalism V	Fix reference on internal functional nature	Via connexion to the environment	Similar in architecture to us according to a loose account of the appropriate level which ensures no architectural chauvinism.	Collapses into common-sense functionalism. Qualia.
Empirical functionalisms Ia - Va	No place for folk roles	As for Empirical functionalism I – V respectively	As for Empirical functionalism I – V respectively	As for Empirical functionalism I – V respectively. Silence on how to identify metal nature