School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics

1st Semester 2005

PHIL1110 / PHIL7111 — CRITICAL REASONING

 


Tutorial Problems 6 - For Week 7

 

From Cederblom, J./D. W. Paulsen (2001) Critical Reasoning, 5th ed., Wadsworth, pp.  206-219.

 


 

A.    Conceptual theories are occasionally offered where there may be unclarity in the use of an existing term of the language, or where a concept is being labelled by introducing a new term into the language. If they are explicitly stated they will take the form of a definition: so a concept labelled as Y is presented: ‘Something is Y if and only if it has property P1 and property P2 and …’ (For example ‘Something is a bachelor if and only if it is a man and unmarried.’) Usually, however, these conceptual theories are not quite explicitly stated. Reconstruct – with all appropriate  charity and fidelity, of course - the conceptual theories that are implicit in the following:

 

  1. Much of the trash hung in art galleries these days isn’t really art, for to be art something must represent an object found in the real world.

 

  1. It cannot be argued whether this law is just. It is obvious that it is just since it was passed democratically.

 

  1. Many questions of ethics could be resolved if people would be mindful that an act is right if it produces happiness and wrong if it produces unhappiness.

 

  1. A work of art can be characterized by noting two features. First, works of art are the product of man’s activity, i.e., they are artefacts. But unlike most tools, which are also artefacts, a work of art is an artefact upon which some society or sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation.[1]

 

  1. The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them.[2]

 


B.            Conceptual theories in arguments may play the role of a premiss. They can be criticized by

(a)          giving a counterexample (eg. ‘The Pope is an unmarried male – and he’s not what we call a bachelor.’)

(b)          showing that the concepts used to do the defining are also in need of clarification. (‘What do you mean by “unmarried”?’)

(c)                showing that the conditions can’t actually be satisfied (so the concept is null.)

 

(i)           Find counterexamples for the following:

 

  1. An object is a work of art if and only if it is made by humans, it resembles an object in nature, and it is beautiful.

 

  1. A person is courageous if and only if the person has been in a position of danger, the person acted with disregard for personal safety, and the person did so for some noble purpose.

 

(ii)          Is the conceptual theory in each of the following clear enough?:

 

  1. An argument is valid if and only if it follows from the premisses.

 

  1. An action is morally right if and only if it is the sort of action a morally upright personin possession of all of the facts would choose.

 

(iii)         Are there incompatible conditions in the following?:

 

  1. A society is free if and only if everyone is permitted by the society to do as he or she pleases, and everyone is encouraged by the society to realise his or her potential..

 

  1. A work of art is aesthetically successful if and only if it would be appreciated by most people, and it enlarges people’s aesthetic sensibilities by teaching them something new.

 

 

 

               



[1] Adapted from George Dickie, “Defining Art,” American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 253-255.

[2] Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: OUP, 1958), 16.