Introduction

The Mencian claim that human nature is good eventually became the accepted position in Confucianism, but for over twelve hundred years the question was disputed with the followers of Xunzi (荀子) who argued the opposite: that human nature was essentially bad. Xunzi, whose name was actually Xún Kuàng (荀況,) is yet another of those early characters whose histories are not very well known – but at least we can be sure of his having existed. His dates are probably something like 310 BC- 220 BC. In Sima Qian’s ‘Records of the Historian’ (c. 74) he is said to have been born in the state of Zhao, and to have gone at the age of fifty (or 15) to join the Ji Xia Academy in the state of Qi, a briefly brilliant institution which attracted many of the philosophers of the Hundred Schools during the Warring States Period, and which we might compare for its influence to the Library of Alexandria in Egypt or to the Nalanda Mahavihara in India. He is supposed to have had as students both Han Fei, whom we have met as the great theorist of the Legalist school, and Li Si, who as Grand Poo Bah under the first emperor shaped many of the enduring imperial institutions (and also recommended burning books and burying scholars.) According to the histories, after his time at that school Xunzi became the usual wandering scholar seeking position. Eventually, he was employed as a minister in Lanling. When his patron there was assassinated he retired but remained in that state until his death.

Heaven, Earth, and Man

Human Nature

The dao  of Man is thus the way of being or behaving that is optimal for Man regarding his relations with Heaven and Earth. Xunzi believed as a good Confucian that the dao for Man was that proposed by Confucius. However, it is clear whereas Heaven and Earth invariably follow their dao because that is their nature, it is equally clear that humans do not have the same advantage and that they may follow or not follow the dao that is set for them. Therefore we can say that their nature is at least not determinative of their following their dao. In this Mencius and Xunzi would doubtless agree, and the difference between them is just that Mencius believed that human nature is, nevertheless, naturally disposed to discover the true dao, whereas Xunzi thought that the true dao was not a natural disposition of human nature.

Xunzi’s arguments are well set out in chapter 23 of the Xunzi, rather bluntly titled ‘Human Nature is Detestable’ (xìng è, 性恶.) There are several, but the fundamental argument is from simple observation. We can see in others, as we recognise in ourselves, that what is natural to man is that he values his self-interest and, all things being equal, will pursue it. Moreover, the effect of this pursuit is to set every man against his neighbour and to make life most unpleasant for everyone.

Now people’s nature is such that they are born with a fondness for profit in them. If they follow along with this, then struggle and contention will arise, and yielding and deference will perish therein.

You may recognise this as being quite similar to Hobbes’s view of the State of Nature that existed (hypothetically) before any sovereign ruled and each man was guided by his own prudential reason. In that case the result was a life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ For Hobbes, the desire to exit the State of Nature was the justification for submission to the sovereign as the necessary condition of escape; and similarly for Xunzi, the escape from this bad condition required the acceptance of external moral codes.

It is necessary to await the transforming influence of teachers and models and the guidance of ritual and yi [righteousness,] and only then will they come to yielding and deference, turn to proper form and order, and end up becoming controlled.

It’s worth noticing at this point that both Mencius and Xunzi believed that men naturally prefer the good – if it is possible to achieve it – and both believe that man is uniquely capable of achieving it, so it might not be absolutely clear where they are in fundamental disagreement. Essentially the controversy comes down to a disagreement over what it means for some characteristic to be something’s ‘nature’ (a controversy which is not unknown also in Western philosophy.) Mencius thought that what constituted the ‘nature’ of a thing was what it was uniquely capable of doing; so the nature of Man was good, because Man uniquely possessed the four seeds of goodness that could be developed into the appropriate virtues. Xunzi thought that the nature of a member of some class was just what was universally true of all members of that class; so the nature of Man was bad because it was a universal truth that Man was guided by the love of profit, which was a tendency that was socially destructive when left uncorrected. From a distance, it might seem that the debate was a case of two schools talking past each other rather than to each other: ignoring the summary judgement on ‘human nature,’ there seems no reason why one would feel forced to choose between their positions.

Ritual

a.         Its Purpose

1.       The Coordination of Interests

One obvious reason for the introduction of ritual was for the coordination of interests in society. This coordination has two parts. In the first place ritual was instituted in order to regulate the behaviour of people and to put limits on their perfectly rational actions to satisfy their selfish desires.

Humans are born having desires. When they have desires but do not get the objects of their desire, then they cannot but seek some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or limit to their seeking, then they cannot help but struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other there will be chaos, and if there is chaos they will be impoverished.[1]

This, again, is reminiscent of an argument made by Hobbes, who identified competition as one of the three sources of contention in the State of Nature.[2] It is usual now when discussing this problem in Hobbes to refer to the Prisoner’s Dilemma of game theory (or the older ‘Tragedy of the Commons’) in which a payoff matrix can be constructed to show how individually rational actions to maximise self-interest result in less than maximal outcomes. Consider this matrix, for example, where the cell numbers stand for years in jail:

In order to escape this consequence, the sovereign is introduced to change the structure of the payoff matrix so that it does not seem to profit one to break the law.

Xunzi’s solution, however, does not change the payoff matrix at all. He simply says that by following the rituals you will fall into the mutually beneficial behaviour desired. The question will be however, given that the human desire to pursue profit remains intact, and human reason operating upon that desire likewise, why would you follow the ritual when not doing so would be to your advantage?

So much for the first part of the coordination of interests. In the second place, it is observed that actual social cooperation (not just limits on competition) is required for Man to achieve his greatest prosperity.

The products of the hundred crafts are means to nurture a person, but even the most capable cannot engage in every craft, nor can people each fill every official post. If they live apart and do not help each other, then they will be impoverished. If they live together but have no social divisions, then they will struggle with each other. Poverty is a catastrophe and struggle is a disaster.

By the introduction of ritual, people are divided into the appropriate classes who recognise their roles in the greater society. When they recognise their roles and do not attempt to usurp the roles of other classes, then they are able to maximise their contributions to society. Farmers will farm and craftsmen will craft, while the emperor rules and the scholars administer. The picture that Xunzi gives is of a fairly rigidly divided society, but we could set that aside and simply recognise that norms of behaviour beyond mere prudential self-interest are required in order to make the best use of the various skills of the people.

2.       The Regulation of Feelings

Another reason that Xunzi gives for the introduction of ritual is so that our natural emotions may be expressible harmlessly, or even beneficially. Xunzi recognises that humans have emotions that they will desire to express, but that the unrestrained or undisciplined expression may lead to great harms. In the case of sadness upon the death of a loved one, the expression of emotion and respect are regulated by the funeral rites, and Xunzi gives a long (very long) explanation of the merits of the rites being just so and the reasons for the differentiation in rites between different layers of society.[3] In the case of various joyous emotions, he explains how the need to express those emotions may be satisfied in various appropriate forms of music.[4] (In this he disagrees with the Mohists, who thought that music was pointless and wasteful.)

In every case ritual begins in that which must be released, reaches full development in giving it proper form, and finishes in providing it satisfaction. And so when ritual is at its most perfect, the requirements of inner dispositions and proper form are both completely fulfilled.[5]

By channeling these emotional expressions through ritual and music one beautifies life as well as imposing upon it good order.

b.         Its Method

If the nature of humans is bad, and yet we wish them to be good (and they wish themselves to be good,) then it follows that their nature must be tamed. This is what ritual does. Xunzi saw the achievement of goodness in a person as a product of the deliberate cultivation of correct behaviours and attitudes; morality was definitely to be attributed to the nurture side of the nature/nurture divide, a product of culture and cultivation.

In every case, the nature of a thing is the accomplishment of Heaven. It cannot be learned. It cannot be worked at. Ritual and yi are what the sage produces. They are things that people become capable of through learning, things that are achieved through working at them.[6]

The attitude is to be contrasted with that of Mencius, for whom ritual was a more or less direct outgrowth from those seeds of goodness he identified in human nature. For Xunzi, on the other hand, ritual was a curb on our natural tendencies.

Crooked wood must await steaming and straightening on the shaping frame, and only then does it become straight. Blunt metal must await honing and grinding, and only then does it become sharp.

Repeated performance and practice and study of the rituals will have the effect of altering one’s nature so that the behaviour mandated by the rituals will become natural to one. In this respect the appropriate comparison is to Aristotle who developed a virtue ethics in which the virtues are dispositions to behave in the appropriate way, and those dispositions are the target of training that attempts to make the appropriate behaviours matters of habit. For example, when one is given reason to believe that a certain degree of willingness to face up to danger is required in order to have the virtue of courage, and one believes that one is lacking in that disposition, then one determines to behave as if one had the appropriate virtue and continue to so act until the behaviour becomes customary to one or a habit, and then becomes a natural disposition; at which time one can say that one has the virtue.[7]

c.          Its Origin

Xunzi does not think that the benefits of ritual are simply those of conventionalised behaviour. These benefits will only follow if the conventions (rituals) are appropriate to their function and respect the nature of humans. No doubt these are difficult to discover, but we are lucky in that the ancient sages provided a number of signposts (biao 表) to the proper Way. [8]

Those who cross waters mark out the deep places, but if the markers are not clear, people will fall in. Those who order the people mark out the Way, but if the markers are not clear, there will be chaos. The rituals are those markers.

Given, however, that the sages were as human as ourselves, the obvious question is how the sages managed to arrive at their knowledge of the Way. Xunzi says that there is no mystery: they discovered proper behaviour in the same way that men discovered the other arts of civilised life – through effort and intelligence.[9]

In every case ritual and yi are produced from the deliberate effort of the sage; they are not produced from people’s nature. Thus when the potter mixes up clay and makes vessels, the vessels are produced from the deliberate efforts of the craftsmen; they are not produced from human nature.

…

Sages accumulated[10] reflections and thoughts and practiced deliberate efforts and reasoned activities in order to produce ritual and yi and in order to establish proper models and measures.

But in that case, why do we need to follow the Way of the sages? Is it not possible for us to also apply our intelligence to discover the Way?

I say, they can do it, but they cannot be made to do it

However

One’s feet can walk everywhere under Heaven. Even so, there has not yet been anyone who who has been able to walk everywhere under Heaven. It has never been that craftsmen, carpenters, farmers, and merchants cannot do each other’s business, however, none have ever been able to do each other’s business. Looking at it in this way, then one is not always able to do what one can do.

The problem is, essentially, that people don’t have the time to invent all the arts of civilisation from scratch – and civilisation could not flourish if they were required to do so. We all stand on the shoulders of giants.