Legalism | |
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Introduction |
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The
Legalists (法家,
fǎjiā, ‘School of
Law’) were a late school which seems to have arisen from a need
to provide a coherent intellectual justification and rationale for the
methods that were being adopted by statesmen and political advisors in the
later Warring States period. Like the other schools we have looked at,
they don’t seem to have been recognised as a distinct ‘school’ until
the Han dynasty historians started to organise the past. In fact, it’s
open to question whether there is enough coherence in the doctrines to
count as a ‘school’. A better way to have looked at the matter would
probably have been in terms of thinkers who are involved in a particular
academic ‘discipline’ – the discipline of applied government.
Considered as a school, however, Hán Fēizi
(韩非子; 280–233)
may be taken as its major thinker: he synthesized the arguments and
positions of several earlier figures into something that could stand as
the beginnings of a complete theory of organization and management. In
this synthesis he recognised at least three fundamental aspects to the
problem of effective rulership: 1.
fǎ (法):
law
from Shāng
Yāng (商鞅, d. 338) 2.
shù
(術):
tact
from Shēn
Bùhài (申不害,
d. 337) 3.
shì
(勢):
authority
from Shèn
Dào (慎到,
ca. 395-315) We shall consider what the ‘Legalists’ had to
say about each of these below.
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Law
and Order |
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Of these, by far the most important to the theory
is the first – it is, after all, what gives the theory its name. The
Legalists argued that the Law ought to be the fundamental medium of social
discipline: that there ought to be laws that described the sorts of
behaviours that were to be allowed or demanded from each person, and that
each person would be compelled by the threat of punishment to obey those
laws. This is the type of system that we live under today and so we think
of it as the only reasonable way to organize society – but it really
isn’t. We only know of published laws in a.
The Failure of the Ancien Régime The
lǐ, of course, are familiar to us from our
discussion of Confucianism. They are the traditional rules of behaviour
(some of which are recorded in various ancient texts) which were accepted
by the nobility as binding on the
nobility. There was no other sanction than social acceptability
associated with the lǐ. If a nobleman violated these standards he would be looked down on,
despised, held in outraged contempt, etc., but there were no punishments
to be applied, since punishment was itself an infringement on the dignity
of a nobleman. The commoners, on the other hand, who could not be expected
to be the morally exemplary specimens that the nobles aspired to be, were
to be guided by xìng,
which were determined by the nobility. If
a nobleman was confronted with a local dispute amongst commoners, or one
had violated some command of his, or there had been some other disruption
to the life of the commoners, then it was up to the nobleman to rectify
matters and to do justice. And he did almost entirely at his own discretion (although guided to some degree by
applicable lǐ.)
He could apply punishments variably, or grant mercy just as he saw fit. Now,
such a system could only be successful so long as the nobles really did
feel themselves to be bound by the lǐ,
and as long as the commoners could trust that the nobleman applying the xìng was virtuous and had the interests of social
harmony upermost, and would do justice to the best of his ability, and
would follow the lǐ.
However, as
Han Feizi describes it, by the time of the Warring States it had become
more and more clear to everyone that the world in which they were living
was a very different world from that of the ancient sages, where lǐ and xìng
could be relied on to keep order. For a start, the new states were too
large to be run according to the traditional principles, which relied to a
significant degree on the personal charisma of the nobility, and the
nobility itself was now too devastated and decadent to play the required
normative role even in a small state. The lǐ
simply were not applicable any longer, and the xìng
were not being fairly or consistently applied. Therefore disorder was the
rule in the world. b.
The Choice of a New Principle It
was clear to the Legalists that some new method of establishing order in
the world was required, and therefore they looked for a new ‘standard’
or ‘norm’ of behaviour. The word fǎ
(法)
at that time was used for all those things, as well as meaning ‘law’.
More particularly it seems to have meant something rather like a
‘pattern,’ as in a pattern of behaviour. Law, of course, is just one way of establishing a pattern of behaviour;
but because of the emphasis that the school did come to place on Law, it
is in fact reasonable to refer to them as Legalists. The choice of Law as the method for giving order to
society was argued for on the basis of a rather gloomy theory of human
nature, which held that (1)
Man was naturally self-interested, and (2) the only
universally effective way of modifying Man’s behaviour was by means of
the ‘Two Handles’ of reward and punishment.[1]
As
Han Feizi said: In ruling the world one
must act in accord with human nature. In human nature there are the
feelings of liking and disliking, and hence rewards and punishments are
effective.[2] By
establishing rewards and punishments according to Law,
this single principle of order could be extended to the whole of society
– so that, in our terms, everyone would be ‘equal before the Law’.
This was a principle established by Shāng Yāng[3]
under the rubric ‘one people’ (一民, yī mín). Lord Shang also
realised that in order for these laws to have the desired effect
they would have to be made known to all, and to be simple and
comprehensible, and, above all, to be predictable in their application:
therefore his principle of ‘fixing the standards’ (定法, dìng fǎ) insisted that the laws be objectively
interpretable and impartial in their effect, so that the element of
subjectivity and privilege in the old system could be eliminated. That
being the case Since the officials well know that the people have
knowledge of fa and orders … they dare not treat the people
contrary to the fa … c.
The Confucian Critique This, which the Legalists considered to be a virtue
of their system, would have been considered by Confucius to be a great
fault. In fact Confucians had two main criticisms of the Legalist system: a.
It eliminates the role of a moral vanguard
heretofore played by the nobility In the Zuozhuan
(左傳, ‘Commentary of Zuo’),
a commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, Confucius is made to comment
on the publication of laws by some small state. (Oddly enough, the laws
were written on tripods.) His opinion there is that: The people will study the tripods and will not honour
the nobles; what function will the nobles then have to preserve[4] For Confucius, the role of the nobility was
precisely to act as moral exemplars, and their virtues would spread
amongst the common people so that even they would benefit from the nobles
following the lǐ. If the nobles are to be made subject to punishments just like the
commoners, it is no longer possible to see the nobles as somehow more
innately virtuous than those below; and the fact that they are no longer
in the position of applying their virtuous discretion in setting
punishments and guiding the commoners means that they are no longer either
able to express their virtues in their judgements, or to affect the moral
understanding of the lower orders. The nobles have no longer any
moral role. This might not be so bad except that it aggravates the second
problem that arises from the Legalist system b.
It encouraged immorality in the commoners Since there is no motivation for the lower orders
– or, indeed, any one – to adhere to the old virtues, the only social
discipline will be that provided by the law. It is now the laws themselves
and alone that determine what is allowable and what is not. This being the
case it is certain that the subjects will study the law carefully looking
for loopholes and omissions such that by clever lawyering an advantage can
be gained. With the law being the only support of social harmony, and the
efforts of all being devoted to subverting the intention of the law, it is
certain that harmony cannot be maintained for long. Thus in the Analects
Confucius says: If
the people be led by laws, and uniformity among them be sought by
punishments, they will try to escape punishment and have no sense of
shame. If they are led by virtue, and uniformity sought among them through
the practice of ritual propriety, they will possess a sense of shame and
come to you of their own accord.[5]
The fundamental point at the back of both of these
criticisms is that the Legalists rejected the idea that the proper goal of
government was the moral transformation or cultivation of the people. They
accepted them as they were – or as worse than they were, as
Confucius/Mencius would think. d.
The Intention of the Law As for the content of all these laws, that
was determined by the legislator, whose intention ought to be ‘the
enrichment of the state and the strengthening of its military capacity.’[6]
In this respect the Legalists were similar to
the Mohists, for their goal was very clearly a specific form of
‘benefit’ to the country. The Legalists
also agreed with the Mohists that a diversity of opinions in the state
could only increase discord, and therefore it had to be eliminated. They
were equally keen on creating uniform standards in all other parts of the
culture, regulating weights and measures, language, axle lengths, etc.
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Methods
of Rule |
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Much
as it would have been preferred, however, these laws could not just appear
out of thin air, and men were still required to apply them. The Legalists
therefore had a need to say something about these necessary
instrumentalities. Han Feizi appealed to the theories of Shen Buhai in
addressing this problem who argued that a ruler would have to apply shù,
or ‘tact’, in order to be effective. He quotes him as saying that Tact
is the means whereby to create posts according to responsibilities, hold
actual services accountable according to official titles, exercise the
power over life and death, and examine the officials’ abilities. It is
what the lord of men has in his grip.[1]
In
general, they hoped to establish a system in which the ruler would
delegate functions and reward or
punish the officials for their performance or failure according, again, to
strict and objective criteria; and each level of government below the
ruler would similarly use reward or punishment on its subordinates. Thus,
it was hoped, the ruler would need to do nothing for everything to be
done. (Sentiments like this have been interpreted as evidence of a
sympathy with Taoism that is often remarked upon, but which seems rather
superficial.) We
don’t need to consider this theory of effective bureaucracy any further
here: it has little philosophical interest for us; but there are a couple
of points that might be remarked on. In the first place we can perhaps
recognise that the emphasis that Shen Buhai placed on the necessity of
making the office-holder adhere strictly to the assigned functions of the
office is inspired by more than just the requirements of rational
organization; it also reflects the common philosophical preoccupation in
Chinese philosophy of making things
correspond to their names. We
saw this most clearly in the Confucian recommendation that the effective
ruler should begin with a ‘rectification of names.’ In the Legalist
case, Han Feizi called it xing-ming,
‘making actualities responsible for their names’. In the second place
Han Feizi recognises that the application of fa
is impossible without shu, and
the use of shu is pointless without fa.
As he says; “tact without law or law without tact is useless.”[2]
Therefore, although it is true that Shen Buhai’s theory of bureaucratic
organization does not depend upon any particular theory of laws that the
Legalists were promulgating, yet it really makes little sense to treat it,
as some have proposed to do, as a theory independent of the Legalist
mainstream. It really has to be considered as an integral part of that
range of moral/political theories. |
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Authority |
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Doubtless,
the Legalists would have liked to eliminate the ruler’s role entirely,
since the ruler, being human, was a weak point where irrationality and
subjectivity might enter into the system. But this was not possible –
partly because there was no possibility of establishing a hierachical
system without a human apex, partly because the Legalists were realists
about the nature of their societies (see, for example, their attitude
towards using the past as a model,) but mostly because they recognised
that the authority of the ruler could not just be a matter of force. Han
Feizi, in his synthesis, appealed to the idea of shì,
which he associated with the thinker Shèn Dào, and which seems to be a necessary property of
the legitimate ruler. It is not a matter of personal charisma, since this
would be too directly inconsistent with the objective and impersonal
thrust of the rest of the philosophy, but is rather a type of moral
authority that is possessed by the ruler in virtue of his occupancy of the
role of ruler. That is to say: moral power is associated with the office
rather than the person in the office. There was already a tendency to this
belief anyway. The idea of the Mandate of Heaven is not inconsistent with
this; with the proviso that the Legalists would not accept that any
individual had the right to claim the Mandate of Heaven other than the
ruler. Han Feizi was quite clear that the overthrow of kings was always
an illegitimate practice.
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Conclusion |
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Given the
aspiration to mechanical, universal application of simple laws, there was
(intentionally) little scope for flexibility. But life is complicated, and
all laws must admit of exceptions and different situations to some degree.
(Judges can not be replaced by simple automata.) The Legalist system would
not, however, make any concessions to the messiness of real human life.
This inflexibility, and the harsh nature of the punishments, made the
Legalist’s programmes unpopular in the end. They also suffered from
being associated with the excesses of the first emperor of Qin, whose rule
was an exemplar of the Legalist philosophy under the guidance of Lǐ Sī (李斯;
Prime Minister of Qin 246-208,) a student of Xunzi and who was responsible
for the death of Han Feizi whom he saw as a threat. Amongst the measures
that he was responsible for were the destruction of as many of the
non-Legalist philosophical works and non-Qin histories as they could get
their hands on, and the deaths of any philosophers who would not bend to
the imperial ideology.[1]
At the same time he instituted a reform of the script. And the combined
effect of these actions was to cause the loss of many old texts and the
imperfect transmission of almost all the survivors. This was an
incalculable cultural loss to
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