{"id":81,"date":"2014-02-10T00:11:00","date_gmt":"2014-02-09T14:11:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/2014\/02\/10\/the-rights-of-zombies\/"},"modified":"2014-02-10T00:11:00","modified_gmt":"2014-02-09T14:11:00","slug":"the-rights-of-zombies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/2014\/02\/10\/the-rights-of-zombies\/","title":{"rendered":"The Rights of Zombies"},"content":{"rendered":"

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An article by Peter at Conscious Entities<\/a> considers the question of whether philosophical zombies have rights. It seems to me that under most forms of ethical theory that have been attractive to philosophers they would do. Let\u2019s consider them systematically:<\/o:p><\/p>\n

(a) Teleological theories<\/o:p><\/p>\n

a.1 \u2013 Consequences are Utilities<\/o:p><\/p>\n

A consequentialist theory \u2013 if it grants rights to any moral agents at all \u2013 does so because the consequences of that grant are better than the consequences of not doing so. Obviously, the most important of these are the members of the class of Rule Utilitarian ethical theories, in which it is claimed that rights are rules of social interaction that, if everyone follows them, together with the other rules that are in force and observed, will lead to greater utility than would be the case if any other rules were followed. \u00a0<\/o:p><\/p>\n

a.1.1 \u2013 Utilities are Felicities<\/o:p><\/p>\n

If utility is understood to be some kind of happiness or pleasure, then the moral agent in question, being a zombie, does not contribute to the result of the felicific calculation. What difference would this make to the result of the calculation? Suppose we got a different result by zeroing out all the contributions to the final sums made by the happiness (positive or negative) of the moral agent. Is this equivalent to considering the case of the calculation for the society as if that agent was simply not a member? Well, not quite, because the agent, operating according to the various rules imagined to be in force, will produce felicific effects in other members of the society. We can say, however, that unless the felicific significance of the zombie agent is greater than that of random other members, there is no reason to believe that it will affect the final outcomes.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

a.1.1.1 \u2013 proportion of zombies<\/o:p><\/p>\n

We might also wonder whether it makes a difference how many zombies there are. In the penultimately extreme case that there is just one non-zombie in the society, it is still likely that the happiness of that one member would be maximised by the calculations that justified the grant of rights in the zero-zombies situation. In the case of a society entirely constituted of zombies, there is no felicific consequence to be considered and no such thing as a distinction between right and wrong or good and bad.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

a.1.1.2 \u2013 determinability of zombiehood<\/o:p><\/p>\n

We might also note at this point that it makes a difference for these kinds of theories whether we are able to determine the fact of zombie-nature and the ease and accuracy with which this determination can be made. If it were possible to make this determination easily and accurately then clearly rules might include conditional statements of application relating to the zombie-status of the agents and patients involved. Such a rule might very well be the rule that came top in the appropriate felicific calculation, and such a rule might very well exclude zombies from the possession of rights. Counting against that possibility, we would have to consider that the philosophical zombies are likely to behave just as non-zombies would behave if systematically discounted in ethical calculations; which is to say, they would likely behave as if they saw themselves as alienated from the moral system in force and this might plausibly lead to more unpleasantness for the non-zombies than if they were all treated identically. <\/o:p><\/p>\n

a.1.2 \u2013 decision theory vs. definitional theory<\/o:p><\/p>\n

At this point the merely notional nature of the calculations involved prevents any further specificity, which is usually the case with this sort of thing. These calculations are never performed \u2013 they are impossible in principle; but from Bentham on utilitarians have been quite clear that their systems are not intended to be decision procedures, but they are intended to demonstrate that there really are precise conditions that distinguish in fact between right and wrong. Our inability, even in principle, to discover these conditions in any particular case, makes no difference to its rightness or wrongness, which is an objective fact of the world. Of course, this may mean that the proper rule to be followed might be a rule containing conditional statements of application relating to the zombie-status of the agents and patients involved \u2013 even if it was in principle impossible to make the determination. We would then be systematically prevented from knowing the right thing to do by yet another of the epistemological blocks to using the felicific calculus as a decision procedure.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

(b) Deontological Theories<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.1 \u2013 Kantian theories<\/o:p><\/p>\n

The standard alternative to the utilitarian theory is some form of deontological theory, usually derived from Kant. Rights in this case derive from the application of the Categorical Imperative. But this has several forms and is justified accordingly in several different ways. The justifications are related, of course, and the classes of good or bad actions determined by each form are supposed by Kant to coincide, so that it should not matter which of these we consider. Since this is not universally accepted, let\u2019s look at the two most important forms of the CI: the universal law form and the principle of ends form.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.1.1 \u2013 Universal Law <\/o:p><\/p>\n

Kant\u2019s justification for this form, though tricky in details, and missing important parts, is fairly easy to apply to the zombie case. We are told that one follows the rule: <\/o:p><\/p>\n

Always act so that the maxim of your action can rationally be taken to be a universal law.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

Any rational being will follow a categorical imperative, because it is only in that way that it demonstrates that it is operating with a Free Will. If it is to distinguish amongst all the things that might be covered by categorical imperatives but are not, it will apply The<\/em> Categorical Imperative. All of the reasoning behind this refers only to the rationality<\/em> of the moral agent. In this case the universal law form of the categorical imperative should apply to any rational being \u2013 and the zombie would be included amongst those along with robots and Martians and smart squid.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.1.1 \u2013 Principle of Ends <\/o:p><\/p>\n

According to the PE form of the CI:<\/o:p><\/p>\n

Treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

This is somewhat trickier. Let\u2019s agree to ignore an objection that worries that zombies lack humanity and therefore are not covered by the CI:PE. This would be defining the zombies out of the question. For convenience we might rephrase it as <\/o:p><\/p>\n

Treat yourself and others, always as ends and never as means only.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

In any case the argument for treating oneself and others (moral agents) as ends is that one and they are unconditionally valuable: they are not valuable just because they are necessary to the achievement of some other end which has value. That would make them merely conditionally valuable. What makes them unconditionally valuable is that they are value-giving. And they are value-giving because they are rational and are able to formulate plans in which some things are conditionally valuable. <\/o:p><\/p>\n

In so far as that goes, the philosophical zombies may be stipulated to be rational and therefore value-giving in just the same way that non-zombies are. The only objection might be that in the case of a zombie it is hard for us to imagine that value really is given to the necessary elements of a plan that it forms. Note that something which is conditionally valuable for the agent X is something for which it can be said that it is valued\u00a0<\/span>by X because it is a means to an end which X desires.\u00a0<\/span>If we are able to give a definition of desiring that does not exclude zombies then we\u2018ve got no problem, otherwise we do.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.2 \u2013 God\u2019s Law<\/o:p><\/span><\/p>\n

Much less popular these days, but still important because the philosophical shape of our rights talk preserves the imprint of its origins therein, is the idea that rights are given to us as amongst the regulations instituted by God for the proper running of the World, His creation. The general picture of is most accessibly put forward by Aquinas, but the consequence in Human Rights is developed by Locke. According to this view, God has so ordained the world that it operates according to certain rules that He has promulgated, whose effect is to make the world perform that function for which God has designed it. (God being rational always has a reason for what He does, and thus had a reason for creating the world and man in it.) Some of these rules we do not have the choice to disobey: these are the Laws of Nature. With regard to others we may exercise our Free Will. These are the Natural Laws. Amongst the Natural Laws are our Human Rights. God has given us a certain number of rights that, if we acknowledge and respect them will lead to the proper functioning of the world. <\/o:p><\/p>\n

Moreover, God has made it the case that we can identify these Natural Laws by the use of reason. Roughly speaking, we can say that, if we assume that God wants us to achieve X in the world, and it seems reasonable to the wisest amongst us that this purpose would best be achieved by organising the world thus and so, then we are justified in claiming that the world is in fact so arranged. The wisest amongst us have determined that God\u2019s purpose is human flourishing in this world, and that this would be best achieved if we all had certain unalienable rights, therefore we do have such rights.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

We could simply stop at this point and just point out that this is essentially the position that we had in the case of the rule utilitarians, except that now we have the claim that utility equal flourishing. For utilitarians the obligation to obey the utilitarian rule comes from the idea that obligations are always conditional on delivering our preferences, and this principle will best deliver our preferences. For Natural Law theorists, the obligation to follow the Law comes from the authority of the creator to organise His creation. (Yes, that\u2019s a moral notion. No I don\u2019t know how it\u2019s justifiable.) But this difference applies only to the originating source of all moral normativity, and we are here concerned with the particular rules which partake of that normative force.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.2.1 \u2013 Zombie flourishing<\/o:p><\/span><\/p>\n

Let\u2019s assume that human flourishing is in fact the worldly function. The questions relating to rights for zombies in this case are pretty obvious, and the first question would have to be: does God\u2019s plan include the flourishing of (human) zombies? We can make some headway on this if we can establish what normal human (non-zombie) flourishing would be. If this flourishing essentially required something like \u2018Joy\u2019 or the experience of the love of God or some other such internalia, then this would be something that a zombie could not achieve, and therefore the flourishing of zombies could not include it. This being the case, zombies would be in the position of beings incapable of participating in God\u2019s plan for the world, and therefore the world was not designed for the flourishing of zombies. Zombies are here to be considered as incidental parts of God\u2019s plan, like animals and plants and the landscape. <\/o:p><\/p>\n

If, on the other hand, human flourishing was something like the development of souls able to know God, then whether or not zombies could flourish would depend on unanswerable questions like whether they had souls (they were not stipulated to lack them) or whether it was possible to \u2018know\u2019 God in the proper way without an experiential capability. And on the answer to such questions would hang the possibility of zombie flourishing. We don\u2019t seem to be getting very far in these theological speculations.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.2.2 \u2013 Zombie rules<\/o:p><\/span><\/p>\n

But happily, none of that may be necessary. It may be sufficient to consider that since zombies behave in exactly the same way that non-zombies do, we could say that the flourishing of the non-zombies under the regulations that would be proposed to allow the flourishing of a population without zombies would be completely unchanged. Unless there was the possibility of some form of regulation that would preferentially encourage the flourishing of non-zombies, there is no reason to modify the Natural Laws that would have been derived for the non-zombie case; and therefore we conclude that zombies would be attributed all the same rights and duties as non-zombies. And so, they do<\/em> have all our rights and duties.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

b.2.2.1 \u2013 discriminating Zombies<\/o:p><\/span><\/p>\n

In the alternative case that we are able to discriminate zombie from non-zombie, and this discrimination may be achieved practicably, the possibility might well arise that we could conditionalise the Natural Law so that some rules would apply differently according to zombie-status. If that were the case, we would again have to refer to the kind and possibility of zombie flourishing before we could know what God would have us so.<\/o:p><\/p>\n

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An article by Peter at Conscious Entities considers the question of whether philosophical zombies have rights. It seems to me that under most forms of ethical theory that have been attractive to philosophers they would do. Let\u2019s consider them systematically: (a) Teleological theories a.1 \u2013 Consequences are Utilities A consequentialist theory \u2013 if it grants […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[36,35],"class_list":["post-81","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy","tag-rights","tag-zombies"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=81"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=81"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=81"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stevewatson.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=81"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}